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Conflict Engagement:  
A Contingency Model in Theory and Practice  
Jay Rothman 
 
Abstract 
The systematic study and applied practice of conflict resolution is now a few decades old and 
is evolving into its own field and perhaps towards its own discipline (Avruch, 2013). I 
believe an essential way forward towards a more robust field and discipline is to build a 
parsimonious contingency approach. That is, an approach for applying our best theoretical 
and analytical tools to diagnosing the nature and status of a given conflict and then 
systematically and adaptively matching up the best methods for constructively engaging the 
conflict as it evolves.  Fisher and Keashly (1991) pioneered contingency theory in 
international conflict resolution, while Sander and Goldberg suggested “fitting the forum to 
the fuss” in domestic ADR a few years later (1994). Since then the notion has caught on and 
is now somewhat in “vogue” (Fisher, 2012). However, surprisingly little development has 
occurred in this arena given the promise it holds.  The contingency model described in this 
article builds on this early theorizing and suggests different conflict intervention methods 
according to conflict type and stage of development. Conflicts are divided into three different 
types: resource-based, objectives-based and identity-based. Each type is conducive to a 
different mode of engagement.  
 
Introduction 
To know what something is, it is often necessary to know what it is not. Thus the 
focus of my work on defining and engaging identity-based conflicts over the past several 
decades has required, at least in part, that such conflict be distinguished from other types of 
more “routine” conflicts (Rothman, 1992, 1997, 2012). In seeking to develop a theory and 
practice for distinguishing and creatively engaging identity-based conflict, I have almost 
accidentally evolved a particular and parsimonious contingency approach, in which conflict 
intervention and analysis become interdependent (Rothman, 2012). This approach suggests 
that conflict specialists begin an intervention by systematically inquiring in to the nature of a 
given dispute, using a simple three-point schematic to identify the stage of conflict 
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development which then sets the stage for intervention choices and design, often on an 
ongoing and evolving basis. 
The field of conflict studies and intervention is now ripe for the development of such 
contingency models. It has almost passed its early growing pains, in which battles were 
waged over which model was “better”—for example needs-based conflict resolution of the 
Burton school (Burton, 1979) or interests-based conflict management of the Fisher school 
(Fisher & Ury, 1981) or the transformation models of the Lederach (1995) or Bush and 
Folger schools (1994), and so forth. The field is at a crossroads. It is time for a concerted 
effort to develop broad contingency approaches in which the field moves beyond the battles 
over models or methods and can begin coalescing around scientific analysis of conflict 
connected to systematic and disciplined determination of which intervention model is best 
suited to treat which type of conflict.  
More sustained attention to contingency approaches, I believe, would fill a serious 
lacuna in the field and help generate some centripetal energy across its valuable but 
sometimes baffling diversity. 
Contingency Approach 
In a landmark article that began to articulate the boundaries of a contingency 
approach focused on ADR in the domestic context, Sander and Goldberg (1994) eloquently 
described their article called, “Fitting the Forum to the Fuss.” Fisher and Keashly previously 
introduced contingency theory into international conflict resolution in 1991. They suggested 
that different types of interventions are useful at different points during a conflict. Fisher 
returns to the theme in a more recent writing, concluding: “The contingency model is an 
idealized representation of a highly complex reality; however, it may descriptively capture 
some of the essence of the relationships between highly escalated conflict and the 
interventions required to address it” (Fisher, 2007, p. 10).  Like a number of other theorists, 
Fisher and Keashly (1991) bifurcate conflict types by distinguishing between objective (or 
substantive) and subjective (or social-psychological) conflict issues, which they suggest need 
to be continually assessed and treated differently during an intervention and modulated 
accordingly. Fetherston (2000) commenting on Fisher and Keashly’s work, writes that 
“within a conflict process there are times when strategies which focus on interests are most 
appropriate and effective and times when a shift in focus to relationships is required” (p. 5). 
A similar dichotomy is also suggested by Marc Ross’ work in which he distinguishes 
between “interests” and “interpretations” (1993). John Burton also dichotomized between 
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“disputes” and “conflicts” (1993), suggesting the first may be “managed” but the latter should 
be “resolved.” Disputes, according to Burton, are routine and deal with concrete goods and 
services, often called interests, while conflicts deal with existential concerns, which he refers 
to as basic human needs (see also Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011). 
I suggest breaking open this dualism by further operationalizing John Burton's (1993) 
distinctions between resource based “disputes” and needs-based “conflicts” by adding a third 
category between them: objectives-based “problems.” The contingency model described in 
this article suggests intervention methods according to these three broad types of conflict. 
The way to foster cooperative engagement in to deep-seated conflicts is different from that of 
objectives-based problems, which is also different from the way to most constructively 
address resource disputes.  The type of intervention suggested is therefore to be determined 
by prior analysis of the nature and depth of the conflict.  Indeed, I suggest, this is one major 
raison d’etre of the field; to bridge careful and systematic analysis with best practices and 
disciplined interventions. 
 In the following section I present a typology of conflicts divided in to resource-based, 
objectives (or goals)-based and identity-based. I am not suggesting this is the right way to 
divide all conflicts, but rather as an example of one theoretically and practically sound way. 
There is no need, as I advocate for a contingency philosophy for our field, in part to 
overcome internecine battles over models, to stake a new claim about a new best model. This 
is just one among a possible many. I then present, in more generic form a broad variety of 
choices that could be made about categories (and some examples of) conflict intervention 
strategies based on this prior conflict analysis. 
The following contingency approach is generic and not specific to either domestic or 
international conflict, and in this it differs from both Sander’s and Fisher and Keashly’s 
foundational contingency approaches. Also, unlike the Fisher and Keashly approach, it does 
not focus on the identity of the intervener (consultant, mediator, etc.) but instead broadly 
groups and hypothesizes various means of constructive conflict intervention according to the 
types and stages of conflict that each set of strategies may be generally best suited to address. 
Conflict Typology: Resources, Objectives, Identity 
In this section I present my analytical model for determining the type of conflict to be 
addressed followed by a case study of an intervention. I present a case study of a conflict and 
contingency-based intervention in an organization, to practically illustrate how to select 
intervention approaches based on prior – and unfolding - conflict analysis.  
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Step One: Analysis. Effective conflict engagement begins by “going slow to go fast.” 
That is, taking the time required to get the definition and dynamics of a conflict conceptually 
right, so that disputants and potential third parties come to agreement about the nature and 
depth of their disagreement. This then builds a foundation for selection of appropriate 
intervention methods. 
The first step in a contingency approach then is to undertake a detailed process of 
conflict analysis, working with disputants to determine either separately or interactively, or 
both, what the conflict is about, why it matters to them, how deep it runs, what is functional 
about the conflict, what is destructive about it, and for whom, when and why, and what might 
be done to mine its creative potential and reduce its destructiveness.  
Given that most people tend to have a natural and conditioned aversion to conflict, 
interveners too often give in to this proclivity and push toward solutions, which may lessen 
the divide. The problem arises when there is a rush to solutions before adequate 
understanding is achieved of the parameters and causes of the conflicts. The deeper the 
problem, the more likely it is that this premature solution-seeking will result in solving the 
wrong problems (Doyle & Straus, 1976). For example, it may lead to attempts at settling 
resource disputes when goal problems need attention, or addressing goal problems with 
“interest-based” solutions that should be preceded by engagement of identity issues. 
Additionally, when conflicts are about identity they may be resistant to “practical” solutions 
and thus the effort to resolve them may lead to deeper intransigence. Instead, a host of other 
types of creative process and insight-oriented ways forward may be, at least initially, 
necessary. While it may be relatively impossible to “solve” identity-based conflicts, it is 
possible to gain insight about them and reach agreement about their dynamics and thus set the 
stage for fractionation and redress of some of its component parts. 
Resource Disputes. Building on Burton’s (1993) notion of “disputes”, resource 
disputes are tangible and observable. Take a hi-tech company where I served as consultant 
and mediator in which hardware and software departments competed for allocation of 
resources. Both department managers made a case for investing available monies in their 
respective departments. This was, at least initially, about the resource itself. Such disputes are 
fairly routine and relatively easy to “fix,” perhaps with a decision based on a mechanism such 
as a cost-benefit analysis over a certain pre-determined time frame. Resource disputes can be 
settled through mixed motive bargaining (Bazerman & Lewicki, 1983) and in part mutual 
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gains can be achieved for all parties with effective and timely interest-based negotiation and 
problem solving (Fisher & Ury, 1981).  
Disagreements that begin as primarily resource disputes can deteriorate into 
objectives-based problems or even into identity-based conflicts. For example, when I was 
called in to mediate the hardware-software dispute, millions of dollars (twice what was 
initially planned) had already been allocated to the software department to adopt new 
software. The software manager had won the resource dispute by persuading the head of the 
company that investment in this area was essential; the hardware manager had lost in his 
effort to receive the funds to improve hardware so current software could be better utilized.  
This win-lose situation created a negatively spiraling dynamic in which the software manager 
was seen as spearheading the future well-being of the company and behaved as such, while 
the hardware manager felt he and his department were not prioritized or treated with adequate 
respect. When he was later blamed for not supporting this new software development effort 
adequately he felt ganged up upon when explaining that given his current resources, he could 
do no more than he was doing. He was blamed for purposely not cooperating fully with the 
software department, which needed better hardware support.  The dispute deteriorated into an 
objectives-based problem for the software manager – “I require more and better computer 
support from the hardware department if our new software is to be effective” – and an 
identity-based conflict for the hardware manager who felt undervalued and blamed (as in this 
example, conflicts may exist at a different level for each of the sides). 
Objectives-Based Problems. Objectives-based problems are more complex and 
harder to empirically determine than resource disputes, and may require some digging to 
determine what they are really about. Objectives, in their most elemental form, are those 
things we seek to accomplish or attain. Problems, most essentially, are those things that keep 
us from fulfilling our objectives. In a widely quoted operational definition of conflict, Hocker 
and Wilmot (1985), suggest that conflict is the interaction of interdependent people who 
perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals (see 
also Folger, Poole, & Stutman, 2005). 
Objective-based problems are those without a great deal of emotional content and can 
often be managed dispassionately, rationally and effectively with third party assistance as 
long as they are addressed in a rational and proactive way.  They are often about contending 
priorities or poor communication over them. Such problems can be addressed through various 
value clarification and goal-setting methods such as appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider, 
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Sorenson, Whitney, & Yeager, 2001), future search (Weisbord & Janoff, 2000), action 
evaluation (Rothman, 2012) and consensus building (Susskind, McKearnan, & Thomas-
Larmer, 1999).  
In the company mentioned above, a new allocation of several million dollars was 
being debated, with the software and hardware managers on opposing sides. Seeking to 
proactively clarify the underlying goals and objectives each side had for seeking this resource 
could have spared them the fight that soon changed from a competition for a limited resource 
in to a deeper identity-based conflict. When an intervener asks the right questions in a timely 
manner to uncover reasons sides have for their opposing positions, differences over 
objectives can become a source of clarification and joint problem solving. “I want more 
funding of hardware since given current time pressures and demands on our business, 
especially with an upgrade of software, we can’t keep up with software’s requests and will 
need more workers.” Or “I want more funding for software since we lack a cutting edge 
system to beat the competition.”  
Instead, given how the solution was arrived at in a win-lose way, it is not surprising 
that for the “winner” deeper objectives-based problems emerged as he felt his goals were 
inadequately supported by the “loser,” who in turn felt hurt and unvalued, and thus did not 
adequately support his former colleague and present adversary.     
In this case, the software manager is concerned with effectiveness in achieving his 
department’s goals (thus for him the conflict is still or now presenting at the objectives level), 
while the hardware manager is not only concerned with the growing demands made to his 
department – he is also concerned by what he feels is lack of recognition and respect (and 
thus the conflict became identity-based for him).  
Identity-Based Conflicts. Identity-based conflicts are often far beneath the surface 
and much more complex to define than are resource or goal conflicts. They are about 
existential needs and values of individuals and groups that are threatened, frustrated and are 
usually competitively pursued in often self-defeating win-lose ways. Identity conflicts often 
emerge out of threats to a personal or collective sense of safety, recognition, self-esteem, 
control over the future and so forth. In our example, the hardware manager believes, “I 
deserve the allocation of money in recognition of my accomplishments and value to the 
company; and I can do better with more resources and thus be valued even more.” Thus, his 
sense of self-worth and recognition are threatened and frustrated. Identity-based conflicts, of 
course, are the most emotionally laden and difficult to engage and convert into opportunities. 
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However, when handled effectively the creative rewards can be great as a great deal of 
passion and energy can be well directed. When mishandled, the passion is combustible and 
deeply destructive dynamics and outcomes are common. 
 In the above mentioned organizational example, I brought the two managers together 
to talk about the source of the conflicts, what was upsetting about each other’s behavior, and 
reframing in terms of their needs and values and sense of place in the organization. This led 
to a greater level of empathy and recognition by the two previously embattled managers, and 
led them to commit to a collaborative goal setting process at the objectives level with their 
respective sides.  
Identity-based conflicts require complex, systems oriented interventions such as 
narrative-based and transformative processes that emphasize dialogue and discovery more 
than solution seeking and early agreement. Such methods designed to address these types of 
conflicts include the interactive problem solving workshop approach of Burton (1990), 
Kelman (1997) and Azar (1990) (Fisher, 1997), the difficult conversations approach (Stone, 
Patton, & Heen, 2000), radical disagreements (Ramsbotham, 2013), the relational identity 
theory approach (Shapiro, 2010) and the ARIA approach (Rothman, 1996, 2012).  
Using a Levels-of-Conflict Analysis Visualization for Diagnosis. Using the 
common metaphor of conflict as an iceberg, identity-based conflicts may be conceptualized 
as residing at the un-seeable, murky bottom. Objectives conflicts are visible, but opaque, just 
beneath the water’s surface. Resource conflicts are above the water and are in plain sight - 
empirical and tangible.  
Another way of differentiating these conflict levels is by the simple questions 
“What?”; “What for?” and “Why?” At the top of the iceberg are the tangible “What’s” of a 
conflict. For example, “I want this real-estate to build on." Going down one level are the 
slightly less tangible “What for's” of a conflict. “I want this territory because only with it can 
my people fulfill its national aspirations to assure its independence." Finally, the deepest level 
of “Whys” are repositories of the deepest coordinates of identity such as “I want this land 
because it is home” (see Figure 1.) 
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Figure 1  
Conflict Typology
 This “levels of conflict analysis” approach visually suggests an important feature of 
identity-based conflict that distinguishes it from the other two. Identity-based conflict 
contains within it the other two levels of conflict as well. Conceptually moving up the 
iceberg, a conflict for example over home and one’s access to and control over it (the root of 
many community and international identity-based conflicts), will also be about broad 
objectives or specific goals (e.g. to accomplish sovereignty and territorial integrity) and 
resources (e.g. economic and military strength). On the other hand goal problems will be 
primarily about goals and resources (e.g. to establish an independent state in order to be able 
to gain and control of economic and military resources). Resource disputes, while also having 
seeds of goal problems and even identity-based conflicts if they are poorly handled, are 
fundamentally about the who, when, and how of the control of tangible resources (e.g. 
gaining access to and control over scarce resources).  Methods of engagement correspond to 
conflict typology, as outlined above and summarized in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 
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When I was called in to the hardware/software conflict, it was a full-blown identity 
conflict, with the two managers hotly disparaging each other personally (though the identity 
aspects of the conflict were more central to the hardware manager than to the software 
manager, for whom it was still mainly an objectives-based problem). It began as a resource 
dispute, which deteriorated into an objectives-based problem as both managers began to 
claim with urgency that the future of the company depended on allocation of resources to 
their respective departments. The heated situation then transformed into an identity-based 
conflict particularly for the software department manager whose sense of dignity and value 
was challenged by the process and outcomes of the initial resource dispute. I dealt with it as 
an identity-based conflict, using ARIA (Rothman, 2012). The conflict was then reformulated 
as an objectives-based conflict, and I used a corresponding approach called Action 
Evaluation (Rothman, 2012).    
Matching Diagnosis with Intervention Strategy. To now further explain how to 
connect between diagnosis and intervention strategy, here are two examples, domestic and 
international, for applying this contingency approach: 
In a conflict between a school board and its superintendent which began over deep 
disagreements about how to manage budgets, personality disputes soon took over as a sense 
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of betrayal and mistrust clouded all effective planning or collaboration between the two sides. 
Is this a resource-dispute, an objectives-based problem or identity-based conflict? This can be 
deduced through the diagnosis methods suggested above. If the conflict is diagnosed as 
rooted in identity (say, the conflict has become deeply personal or the parties are of a 
different race or gender and feel discriminated against on that basis), surfacing and engaging 
the deep differences through one or a number of identity-based methods is the first stage in 
intervention. If the conflict is analyzed as objectives-based, intervention begins with 
clarifying goals and values before addressing concrete resource distribution and outcomes. If 
the conflict is simply about the resource interventions can be designed to help parties reach 
agreements on best means to divide, share or trade them. There is also a less preferable 
alternative:  the mediator might first address the conflict as objectives or resource-based, and 
if parties are unsatisfied or if problems have worsened, might inductively discover that it is 
necessary to move down to deeper levels of analysis and intervention (i.e. as an identity-
based conflict).   
Or at the international level, imagine Israelis and Palestinians all seeking an end to 
their conflict and agreeing in principle about the need for a two-state solution. Next steps 
should be easy, right? Not at all unless it is clear at what level they are operating. Is it about 
negotiating final status agreements over who gets what resource, when and how (i.e. the 
nature of a political settlement)? This would merit principled bargaining, for instance. Is it 
about the nature and purposes of that two-state solution (i.e. how will they work together on 
environmental issues? What kind of trade agreements will be reached between the two 
entities?)? If so, goal setting would be an appropriate approach. Or is it about the identity of 
each community (i.e., dignity, religious beliefs, control over destiny and so forth and ways 
that state will fulfill or further frustrate such existential needs and values)?  In that case, 
surfacing contending issues and engaging in “difficult conversations” effectively would be 
appropriate. 
From Theory to Practice – Limitations and Opportunities for Practitioners 
One of the main strengths of this contingency approach for practitioners is to provide them 
with a mental model to organize and guide both conflict analysis and interventions based on 
it. It has helped many practitioners in all types of conflicts across many different countries to 
design and implement constructive interventions (Rothman, 2012). It has assisted both third 
parties and disputants to be able to read from the same score of music – that is to talk about 
the same things (i.e. levels of conflict) at the same time in the same way (type of intervention 
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strategy) for the same reasons. This goes far in moving conflict toward cooperation. On the 
other hand, like all models, it has limitations in the translation from pure concept to messy 
practice. Models are simplifications of reality that can help to organize and formalize 
thinking and acting. But if we view models as reality we reify them, and in that way reduce 
their effectiveness by seeking to conform reality to them, instead of adapt models as useful to 
address the vagaries of real life.  
 Another limitation, which may also be a strength of this model, is that not all 
practitioners are or should strive to be masters of all approaches. For example, my expertise 
is identity-based conflicts. Thus, after assessing conflicts, I have told potential clients that my 
focus on deeply rooted identity-issues may be too much for their situation. Instead, they 
might do better finding (and I may refer them to) someone who specializes in concrete 
problem solving methods (like principled bargaining). 
 One very specific caution for practitioners is, while perhaps obvious, useful to 
articulate. The levels-of-conflict analysis tool, while useful, is imprecise. It is probably not 
realistic to think that we ever fully distinguish one level from another in pure forms. Indeed, 
in another article a colleague and I suggest that underneath all conflicts – even resource-based 
– lurk deeper layers of identity issues. And so too, if we unpack the densely constructed 
conflicts in which identity issues are so salient, we can “move up the iceberg” and 
constructively attend to differences that are more about goals and “above them” in the 
iceberg, that are expressed by concrete resources (Rothman & Alberstein, 2013). Indeed, the 
differences between resource conflicts and goals conflicts are often hard to determine. And 
yet, even with these limitations, I and many others have found this contingency model useful 
for both conceptualizing conflicts, trying to distinguish between them and using this as a kind 
of hypothesis to design and manage interventions. However, humility is always warranted in 
this work of ours and so, even as we may use this model to design interventions, we can at 
the same time use it to critique and readjust our strategy as we go. As one colleague told me 
as he learned and applied the ARIA model to a complex intervention between Israeli and 
Palestinian community leaders outside of Jerusalem some years ago: “the model provided me 
with a framework that both gave me confidence and humility at the same time” (Ross & 
Rothman, 1999).  
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Conclusion 
The above contingency model is a result of my effort to distinguish identity-based 
conflict and to take theory into the field, helping to make it "useful" to those on the ground 
(e.g. interveners and disputants and policy makers). Moving in the other direction, I have also 
sought to continually view practice through the lens of rigorous analysis and in the service of 
replicable theory building.  
Some three decades ago as a doctoral student of John Burton, Edward Azar and 
Herbert Kelman, I sought to build upon their efforts to build a robust model of international 
conflict resolution (the Problem Solving Workshop) (Rothman, 1992). At Azar's Center for 
International Conflict Management and Development, we began an ambitious project to build 
a Grand Theory of conflict resolution. Our questions then were essentially about the nature of 
international protracted social conflict and how it could best be understood and addressed. 
My questions now are even more global (and local): how can we as theorists and practitioners 
develop a flexible, inclusive and overarching theory of conflict and its creative engagement 
that can knit our disparate and often fractious field more effectively together in both theory 
and practice? I believe a contingency approach is one useful and robust answer. 
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What is “the good” of arts-based peacebuilding? 
Questions of value and evaluation in current practice 
Mary Ann Hunter and Linda Page 
 
Abstract 
In a context of growing attention to the benefits of the arts in peacebuilding, this article 
reports on the findings of a small scoping study that aimed to identify how the arts are 
perceived and supported by international development agencies.  Based on a 2012 analysis of 
five international aid agencies working in the South East Asia and Pacific region, the study 
found that arts and creative practices are not, as yet, afforded a significant role in current 
policy or strategy, although arts activity is recognised as a social development tool by 
agencies working in partnership with local organisations.  Resulting from an analysis of 
participating agencies’ publicly available documentation, and interviews with staff, arts 
practitioners and volunteers working in field-based arts projects, this article argues that the 
value of arts-based interventions in peacebuilding and development is yet to be fully realised.  
Bringing field experience as well as policy and research backgrounds to the analysis, the 
authors consider why this might be the case and pose broader questions about the 
communication, role and influence of evaluation as one factor in this.  They argue for a better 
acknowledgment of the diverse applications and implications of the “use” of the arts within 
complex social, political, and cultural systems by linking this call with evaluation 
methodologies that may better reveal the ways in which such projects “raise possibilities” 
rather than “confirm probabilities.”  This article suggests a four-question schema for 
augmenting the documentation and evaluation of arts-based work to more authentically 
capture “the good” that may arise from the emergent nature of artmaking itself.    
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Introduction  
In fields as diverse as education, health, public policy and community development, 
much has been claimed for the benefits of arts participation.  As leading arts evaluation 
scholar, Matarasso (2003) points out,  
the idea that art is, in some way or another, good for us … is as old as art 
itself, and philosophers of conservative, liberal and inconsistent political 
views, from Plato, through Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche to the present day, have 
advanced equally varied interpretations of it. (p. 343) 
It is therefore unsurprising that there is growing attention to “the good” of the arts as a 
tool for building peace.  To date, documentation of the role of the arts in peacebuilding has 
included studies of traditional, contemporary, formal and informal creative practices.  To give 
a sense of this diversity, there is recent research in peacebuilding and music (Bergh, 2011; 
Pruitt, 2011; Urbain, 2008), ritual (Schirch, 2004; Senehi, 2002; Walker, 2011), theatre 
(Cohen, Varea, & Walker, 2011), youth cultures (Hunter, 2005), and storytelling (Kyoon, 
2009).  The arts have been identified as a vehicle to represent, respond to, prevent and 
transform conflict, with positive impacts claimed beyond social peacebuilding (Ricigliano, 
2003) where most art-based practices may be claimed to sit, into political and structural 
peacebuilding as well (Dunphy, 2012; Epskamp, 1999; Lederach, 2005; Liebmann, 1996; 
Shank & Schirch, 2008; Thompson, 2009; Thompson, Hughes, & Balfour, 2009; Zelizer, 
2003).  A number of studies extend beyond project documentation to investigate the ethical 
complexities, practitioner challenges, and unintended outcomes that arts activity in conflict 
and post-conflict settings can generate.  Foremost among these is James Thompson’s 
Performance Affects (2009) in which Thompson charts his own experience as an arts-based 
fieldworker in Sri Lanka.  Thompson’s interrogation of the value and ethics of arts 
interventions in places of war and conflict is particularly incisive, given that a group of 
community participants with whom he had worked became victims of a massacre in the 
months following his visit.  In articulating a distinction between effect and affect, Thompson 
makes a persuasive case for the impact of the arts as immeasurable.  Any authentic evaluation 
of its application in such settings can only, at best, be inconclusive.       
Studies such as Thompson’s (2009) highlight the need for more critical investigation 
of the complexities that underlie a convergence of these two fields of practice – art-making 
and peacebuilding.  Risks and unintended impacts do get acknowledged in individual project 
reports and in works of creative research and reflection such as Performance Affects.  But, at 
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the same time, the variety of activities and approaches that are subsumed under umbrella 
definitions of “the arts” can lead to generalised assumptions and underacknowledgment of its 
potential and impact.  A reliance on valourising the benefits of arts participation – “the good” 
of the arts – without further critical attention to its complexity in practice and the importance 
of its situatedness in social, political and cultural terms, could ultimately undermine its value. 
This article aims to contribute to this growing exploration of the arts’ role in 
peacebuilding by conveying evidence of how arts-based activity is valued – and evaluated – 
in the domain of international development.  What do the policies and strategies of the 
development agencies that are most likely to fund peacebuilding arts projects tell us about 
how the arts are valued?  How do these findings relate to the perceptions and experiences of 
artsworkers and volunteers in the field?  In investigating these questions, we have identified a 
disjuncture between practice and policy: a gap in understanding about the nature of 
emergence in arts-based development work that we believe could be addressed through a 
reframing of how such work is evaluated.  To address this, we arrive at a set of new 
framework evaluation questions that may augment (not replace) conventional logic-frame 
evaluation approaches to allow for context-sensitive and humanities-inflected processes of 
more appropriately assessing and communicating “the good” of the arts when it comes to 
building peace.  
Methods 
This article uses a small qualitative study of five government and non-government 
development agencies’ work in Australia and the South East Asia and Pacific region, as a 
locus for discussion.
1
  The agencies include an international rights-based anti-poverty agency, 
an international Christian relief and advocacy organisation, an independent emergency relief 
and development organisation for children, a government overseas aid program, and an 
international partnerships development organisation.  The initial study aimed to investigate 
the existence and extent of policies, strategies and priorities within these organisations for 
supporting arts-based and cultural activities generally, and in conflict-affected communities 
more specifically.  The methods of study included: analysis of publicly available agency 
documentation for references to arts-based and cultural activity; correspondence with 
administrative and program staff of each of the five agencies; and semi-structured electronic 
interviews with five in-country practitioners currently or recently working in arts-based 
                                                 
1
 This research study received approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) network – 
Reference Number H12081.  
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projects in the region.  The objective of these interviews was to deepen an understanding of 
the rationale and purpose behind organisational support for arts-based projects and to garner 
individual workers’ perceptions of and attitudes to working with the arts in such contexts.  
While certainly not generalizable, particularly given the study sample’s distinctive 
regional and cultural focus, the findings of this small study reveal a valid foundation for 
raising further questions as to how arts-based peacebuilding is perceived and evaluated at an 
organisational level.  This article elicits questions and a broader research agenda from this 
data, by contextualising the study’s findings within current debates of evaluation in 
peacebuilding practice.   
Definitions of Arts-based Peacebuilding 
In this research, an inclusive definition of the arts is used.  While informed by Cohen, 
Varea and Walker’s (2011) expansive notion of arts and peacebuilding and Shank and 
Schirch’s (2008) categorical use of the term strategic arts-based peacebuilding, this study 
adopts the phrase arts-based peacebuilding to denote artistic and creative practice that 
represents, responds to, seeks to transform or prevent the occurrence and negative impacts of 
conflict and violence.  
This definition encompasses activities associated with conventional arts practices 
such as creative writing, dance, drama, media arts, music, or visual arts; as well as cultural 
activities such as oral storytelling, games, festivals, rituals, and traditional or environmental 
practices.  Such activities may be conducted individually (as in the work of a solo visual 
artist, for example), or communally and collaboratively (as in a group music-making activity, 
for instance, or a film festival in which filmmakers, performers and audiences are involved). 
Such activities can be considered formal (in the context of community-accepted and 
recognised practices in designated arts spaces such museums or theatres) or informal (less 
circumscribed by traditional or established definitions of the disciplines of “the arts” and/or 
occurring in non-arts-specific settings).  Our definition of arts-based peacebuilding, for the 
purposes of this research, rests on a distinguishing feature of arts-based work with 
communities that has an intentional element of representing, responding to, preventing or 
transforming conflict as a way to build “positive peace” (Woolman, 1985). 
It is important to note that the majority of respondents in this study did not usually 
apply the term peacebuilding to their work, even though the intention of their work could be 
identified as such.  Therefore in this research there is something of a part to whole 
relationship of peacebuilding to development.  This relationship between the terms 
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peacebuilding and development is not intended to simplify the complexity of peacebuilding 
or development in diverse settings.  Rather, this is to acknowledge that much of the arts-
based peacebuilding activity that occurs, in the Australian and Asia Pacific region, in which 
we are working, does so within an international policy context of aid and development.   
Policy? What Policy? Instrumental versus Integrated Approaches  
to Arts in Development 
In this study, it was unsurprising to find that arts and cultural activities did not feature 
significantly in the policies, strategies or current priorities of the sample aid agencies’ work.  
It was clear that the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals were a key focus for 
these organisations’ policymaking, reporting and evaluating.  And while it was acknowledged 
by a number of participants in the study that arts activity did occur within projects that 
contributed to these goals, overarching statements about the role of arts or culture were 
mostly absent.  This was confirmed in follow-up correspondence with individuals who 
worked in management and program positions in education, partnerships development, 
project development, communications, and research and evaluation within the participating 
organisations.  When asked “What is your organisation’s policy, strategy, and/or priority for 
supporting arts-based and cultural activities?”, characteristic responses included “we have no 
direct policies [on arts and culture]”,  “arts and culture type projects are not what we would 
typically do”, and “we don’t fund those kinds of projects as a priority.”  
Documentation of significant arts-based projects did exist online and images of such 
work featured prominently in website communication and hard print materials, such as 
organisational reports and advocacy documents.  The value of dynamic images of community 
and individuals engaged in and engaged by the arts is clear.  But beyond these 
representational “good story” opportunities, it was evident that various kinds of arts activity 
were being supported, either financially or through organisational volunteer placements.  One 
organisation was supporting a major multi-year, multi-location arts project that was 
developing the capacity of Australian Indigenous artists to develop their own social enterprise 
businesses in the production and sale of visual art.  As a response to the negative and 
marginalising social and economic impacts of colonial conflict between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples in Australia, this development project engaged with the arts in a way that 
aimed to build social and economic capacity through cultural expression.  By providing 
professional development opportunities for Indigenous community members in arts business 
management, the organisation’s intentional goal was to foster self-determination in a context 
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where political and social power had been eroded.  This approach to integrating social, 
economic and cultural capacity-building goals within a business enterprise model appeared to 
be a context-sensitive response to the interdependent nature of social, cultural and artistic 
meaning-making in Australian Indigenous communities; for in Australian Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander cultures, arts practices can be a direct expression of social relationships 
and of cultural ways of knowing and being.  Artworks can convey important ancestral 
narratives, kinship relationships and community understandings of time, space and land.  
Their dissemination as artworks and as “ways of knowing”, it could be argued, contribute to 
significant peacebuilding.  Similarly, another organisation’s volunteer project in Thailand 
was represented as achieving integrated social enterprise goals with marginalised 
communities of women via their traditional textile making practices.  For the community of 
women involved, these practices held specific cultural meanings and value related to 
representations of ethnicity and gender.  
The strong profile of these integrative practices of the arts did not seem to correlate to 
any similarly strong or distinctive organisational (or managerial) perception of the arts.  For 
instance, one of the organisation’s respondents stated “there is probably arts and cultural 
content in our projects but it is used as a communication tool.”  The variation between the 
generalised comments about the instrumental value of the arts (as a “tool” for communication 
or social enterprise) and more nuanced attention to integrative values (with respect to the 
ways in which the arts make meaning within social, cultural, political and aesthetic domains) 
is not uncommon.  It reflects the core of policy debates that have characterised the field of 
socially-engaged arts practice internationally over the past 20 years: that is, a debate around 
how the value of the arts is assessed and communicated – questions to which this paper will 
return. 
A publication launched by one of the participating organisations during the period of 
this study did signal a shift toward a more complex and nuanced valuing of the arts within the 
context of aid and development.  Austraining International, one of three volunteer agencies 
delivering the Australian Volunteers for International Development program (AVID), 
published a focus issue of the quarterly magazine, Connect, titled “The Art of Development” 
(Austraining International, 2012).  This focus issue profiles the work of ten volunteers 
engaged in arts-based assignments within the Austraining International program whereby, as 
field workers, their goal is described as “work[ing] with local people to reduce poverty by 
sharing knowledge, developing sustainable skills and building the capacity of individuals, 
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organisations and communities” (Austraining International 2012, p. 3).  While the AVID 
program’s Manager of Research and Evaluation commented that “AVID has no sectorial 
expertise on arts or culture and no policy about it”, she indicated that AVID takes its lead 
from local partner NGOs as to their program priorities, “which sometimes involve arts, 
creativity and cultural development.”  It is clear that Austraining International is not the 
initiator of such arts projects, but functions as a partnering organisation by contributing 
sectorial expertise through volunteers’ professional skills and knowledge.  As the Manager of 
the volunteer program of AVID states in the Connect magazine, the aim is to profile “how 
Australian Volunteers are providing skills and expertise to assist other organisations as they 
collect, document, and channel the richness that makes up their peoples’ local cultural 
heritage” (McCulloch, 2012).  Examples of projects in “The Art of Development” range from 
theatre performance to documentary film and traditional handicrafts, providing insight into a 
range of integrated (as distinct from instrumental) approaches to working with the arts as a 
means of supporting locally-driven change in complex societies.  It was significant, therefore, 
to see this acknowledgement of the more complex value systems that intersect with the arts’ 
“use” in such settings (such as the meaning that specific artform practices or processes may 
have within cultural, political, social and regional domains) via the work of volunteer 
practitioners themselves. 
Practitioners’ Insights 
It was apparent in this study that while the sustainability of cultural practices and 
preservation of cultural heritage are acknowledged under many national and international 
goals for cultural development, the arts as an expression of culture did not appear 
significantly in the policies or strategies of the agencies studied.  Yet, individual arts projects 
were being publicly profiled as “good practice” in development and in agency-community 
partnerships, albeit as good photo opportunities at times.  The study revealed that on the 
ground field-workers conveyed a nuanced understanding of the value of the arts and cultural 
practice to their community-based work and, unsurprisingly, as artists and artsworkers 
themselves these field practitioners were articulate about what they saw as the real and 
potential contribution of the arts to development goals, agency-community partnership, and 
peacebuilding more broadly.  Yet, these study participants expressed the challenges of 
working within organisational and managerial contexts where there was limited awareness of 
the value of the arts beyond single-focus instrumentalism.  One participant in the study, for 
example, claimed she felt the need to spend as much time advocating to stakeholders for the 
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importance of arts-based work, as much as actually practise it.  This confirmed a sense that 
arts-based development and peacebuilding, despite being a growing field of practice and 
scholarly inquiry, was not yet well understood at an organisational and managerial level.  It 
appeared that generalised organisational assumptions about “the good of the arts” sometimes 
side-tracked a need to raise awareness of its capacity and complexity.  Here follows insights 
into some of those complexities from two Austraining International volunteer fieldworkers 
who were engaged in local arts-based projects in the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste.  
William Head, a participant in this study, was an Australian volunteer who worked as 
the film and photography program curator of the 11
th
 Pacific Arts Film Festival held on the 
Solomon Islands in 2012.  Head described his motivation to pursue this work as the 
opportunity to  
contribute in a meaningful way to the development of a nation.  This was partially 
about the positive economic impacts of staging a major international event, but to my 
mind, ultimately about contributing to a shared national identity for an otherwise 
cultural[ly] disparate nation.  
Head perceived the value of the Festival in many ways.  It not only enabled various 
communities in the region to reclaim and profile a shared sense of identity through 
engagement with their traditional Pacific Islander cultures, but Head also observed that  
there was much comment in the media and in general conversation [within the local 
community]… that [the festival] would be a test and proof of how far the Solomon 
Islands had progressed since the ethnic tensions during the last decade.  
Evident in Head’s discussion was an awareness of the ways in which the arts festival had 
potential to build cultural and social capital in a post-conflict setting, as well as be a litmus 
test for achievements of political and structural peacebuilding as well.  Could the city of 
Honiara manage to logistically stage the Festival?  Could the nation assess something of its 
own peacebuilding achievements by measuring the city’s capacity to deliver on the 
organisational and material infrastructure needed for the festival to occur?   
Head describes in his report for Austraining the range of positive outcomes for 
participants.  He cites feedback from individuals who attended the films and associated 
photography exhibition and comments on the way that the festival had helped them reclaim 
community histories and cultural narratives.  It is clear that participating artists in the festival 
valued the opportunity for public presentation of their work and, since the event Head has 
observed the development of locally-sustaining networks and professional development 
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opportunities for filmmakers.  As a project supported by the AVID program (through Head’s 
volunteer placement), the Pacific Arts Film Festival demonstrated the kinds of multi-layered 
impacts and implications that arts and cultural events can have as both a process for, and 
measure of, peacebuilding in communities.  This could be seen as a characteristic of arts-
based work that reaches far beyond instrumentalism.  
For Holly Schäuble, another Austraining International volunteer and participant in 
this study, engagement with the arts as both a process and a measure of peacebuilding is 
similarly apparent.  Working as co-director of Many Hands International, an organisation that 
supports artistic and creative expression in developing countries in the South East Asia 
region, Schäuble described the ways in which one of Many Hands International’s 2012 
projects with young people in the regional town of Lospalos in Timor Leste aimed to promote 
children’s rights through “an intensive community social action theatre making project.”  The 
project’s objective was to bring the Nafo Fila theatre company from a distant regional town 
of Ainaro to Lospalos with the intention to work with and engage young people in theatre 
making.  Interestingly, the project also offered the emergence of other opportunities for 
intergenerational engagement.  Six lia nain (elders) became involved and, as a result, sacred 
ratu stories of the community were shared amongst the elders for the first time, and further, 
collectively shared with the community in a public performance by the young project 
participants.  As Schäuble observed, “There was an overwhelming sense of the significance 
of this for breaking down divisions between the various ratu, with whom people in Lospalos 
identify strongly and between whom there are long standing traditional rivalries” (Schäuble, 
2012, p. 6).  This project was an initiative in which art (in this case, interactive theatre) 
allowed for other kinds of new emergent opportunities for community development and 
relationship-building to take place.  The aims of the project – to make and present theatre – 
were flexible yet robust enough to accommodate opportunities for further peacebuilding as 
they arose.  As a result, the project then became more relevant to the actual needs and 
interests of that community.  The project yielded important peacebuilding gains for the lia 
nain, their intergenerational connections, and for community cohesion more broadly.  These 
were significant outcomes that were not intended as the end goal in themselves, but their 
significance and relevance to the community lay in the fact that they emerged through the 
“contextually ambidextrous” (Shank & Schirch, 2008, p. 233) act of artmaking itself.  It was 
not just about the arts as a communication vehicle.  
 Schäuble’s co-director of Many Hands International, Kim Dunphy, has written about 
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the range of positive impacts of this kind of participatory arts work in development contexts.  
These include the “maintenance of cultural heritage and identity, stimulation of creativity, 
health promotion, peace-building, trauma recovery, skill development, income generation and 
environmental awareness raising” (Dunphy, 2012, p.187).  Drawing on a range of examples, 
Dunphy advocates for a multi-dimensional approach to valuing artswork in international 
development, employing Jon Hawkes’ (2001) concept of culture as the “fourth pillar of 
sustainability” as a theoretical base.  In her reporting and associated research, Dunphy argues 
how change within such projects can be examined within paradigms that value “the 
dimensions of social equity, cultural vitality, economic viability and environmental 
sustainability” (Dunphy 2012, p. 187).  Schäuble further reiterates the complex value of the 
arts in such settings, describing the connection between culture, poverty, conflict and 
peacebuilding:   
Culture is not the first (or usually even the last) thing people think of when it comes to 
addressing poverty, but it has a vital role to play in achieving sustainable 
development. …Where culture is weakened, interrupted or lost through conflict, 
colonisation, globalisation and/or poverty, we can see a corresponding loss of social 
cohesion and community wellbeing as people struggle to make sense of, and adapt to, 
a changing world. (Schäuble, 2012, p. 6) 
Measuring Value and Change:  The Challenge of Evaluation 
These arts practitioners’ perceptions of the value of the arts in post-conflict settings 
convey nuanced appreciation and understandings of the multidimensional nature of the 
outputs, outcomes and impact of arts activities.  Their projects and their individual 
perceptions about their work reveal how arts-based activity can operate beyond instrumental 
uses (such as direct communication) and beyond being a catalyst for economic enterprise.  
These practitioners draw attention instead to the diverse benefits and potential of such work 
within complex social (Loode, 2011), political, cultural and intergenerational systems of 
meaning and value.  Head recognised that the “good of the arts” in the Pacific Arts Film 
Festival, for instance, was beyond just a celebratory showcase of culture and regional 
identity.  The Festival’s impact could be valued at other levels: as an indicator of structural 
peacebuilding and civic achievement, and as the catalyst for sustainable networks in a 
growing local film industry.  In Many Hands International’s Lospalos project, Schäuble and 
Dunphy brought focus to the change in the quality of intergenerational relationships, and the 
“newness” of offering a contemporary re-aestheticising of important community stories by 
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the younger generations involved.  Local narratives became re-invested with contemporary 
meaning and value by a multi-generational community rebuilding their social fabric 
following violent conflict.   
Yet, the question remains, why does policy and strategy not yet adequately “speak” to 
this potential and complexity?  How might these practitioners’ understandings and insights 
into the value of arts practice in the field better influence the ways in which arts and cultural 
expression are communicated at an organisational level: with managers, donors and 
government agencies?    
It can be suggested from this small regional study that further dialogue among local 
and international drivers, implementers and participants of development work is required to 
foster broader-based understandings of the complex value and practices of arts-based 
peacebuilding.  While there is growing attention to this field of work in academic settings, 
our findings suggest that a practical avenue for such dialogue among practitioners and 
policymakers is evaluation.  For in our own experiences as artsworkers in community and 
international development settings, it is evident that evaluation reports – whether compiled by 
project implementers or independent evaluators – can often be the sole channel of 
communication about on-the-ground activity to organisational and external stakeholders.  
Yet, it is our contention that sole use of conventional evaluation processes, particularly those 
based on logic models (Leeuw, 2003), serve to exacerbate an instrumentalist rather than 
complex view of the arts.  Such models do not suit the task of adequately capturing and 
communicating the diverse outputs, outcomes, impacts and diversity of arts-based 
experiences.  Before suggesting ways in which a reframing of evaluation in arts-based 
projects might better address the practice/policy disjuncture, it is worthwhile considering the 
ways that conventional evaluation models are themselves based on presuppositions about the 
nature and value of change. 
Conventional approaches to evaluation in international development (and in other 
environments), are driven by needs to monitor and assess a project’s process, effectiveness 
and impact.  The starting point is often a project or program’s preconceived set of aims, goals 
and benchmarks against which its success has been deemed to be measured.  Theories of 
change become evident in evaluation design: it is assumed that evidence of change will be 
available (or at least observable), and that such evidence can be collated and validated to 
measure the impact and success of the project’s achievement in meeting its intended goals.  
Such approaches are built on a positivist paradigm of knowledge construction that seeks 
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(mostly implicitly) to confirm probabilities: i.e. the intervention/project is implemented on 
the assumption that it will probably achieve the stated objectives; further implying that 
similar activity has probably been successful before and could be probably be replicated 
under similar conditions elsewhere.  Therefore, evaluation often occurs within this implicit 
positivist discourse that seeks to aggregate information to enable informed judgement as to 
the probability of similar projects achieving similar results again and/or elsewhere.  In many 
circumstances, this approach is entirely valid.  For example, where the arts are explicitly 
“used” as a communication tool (for public health messages, for instance), or as an 
instrument for business enterprise, the activity may fit well within this kind of evaluation 
paradigm.  Yet, given the complex ways in which the arts can also convey, contribute to, or 
unsettle a community’s systems of social, political and cultural meaning in more interactive 
ways (such as demonstrated by the Pacific Arts Film Festival and Many Hand International’s 
Lospalos project) these kinds of evaluation approaches limit appropriate assessment.  In some 
arts-based interventions, intended and observable change may be sought from the outset, 
thereby suiting logic frame approaches to evaluating results (i.e. outputs, outcomes and 
impacts) against inputs and activities (Schalock & Bonham, 2003).  But, as Lederach points 
out, the central paradox that unites the fields of peacebuilding and the arts is the desire to 
achieve outcomes that do not yet exist (Lederach, 2005).  Predetermining the change that is 
most contextually relevant and needed in a multi-layered peacebuilding process is 
problematic.  Strict goal orientation can limit the generative capacities of building in 
peacebuilding (and making in art).  What to do, then, when seeking to more authentically 
evaluate and communicate on effectiveness or “success”?  What frameworks are appropriate 
to gauge whether such activity is in fact “good” or ethical or appropriate within the political, 
social and cultural contexts in which it occurs?   
Evaluation studies literature published recently in the Australia and Asia Pacific 
region is replete with critiques of and divergences from the “logic model” of evaluation, 
particularly when it comes to development and community-based work (Donnelly, 2010; 
Mertens, 2010; Nagao, 2006; Renger, Wood, Williamson, & Krapp, 2011; Tennant, 2010).  
Most studies uniformly argue that charting success and effectiveness on the achievement of 
preconceived goals is inadequate to the task of valuing and evaluating interventions in 
complex peacebuilding and community settings.  There exists a range of more multi-layered 
contemporary systems-based approaches to evaluation that appear to better address 
complexity and influence in determining value and success (Boyd et al., 2007; Cabrera, 
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Colosi, & Lobdell, 2008;  Henry & Mark, 2003; Renger et al., 2011; Tennant, 2010).  These 
approaches and theories allow for greater acknowledgment of context, situation, diverse 
theories of change, and ongoing implications and outcomes of work.  Furthermore, these 
studies speak of expansion and/or augmentation of logic models in an effort to empower and 
sustain local processes of evaluation involving community members more actively in 
evaluation methods themselves (Donelly, 2010; Mertens, 2010).  These research 
developments are relevant to how we may progress a more appropriate framework for the 
evaluation of arts-based peacebuilding.  
In light of this, a notable feature of our interviews with field practitioners was their 
attention to “what happened next” when asked to assess or convey the impact of their work.  
This tendency to talk of the future – not necessarily in terms of extending the projects 
themselves, but identifying the work as a catalyst for a future (or kinds of future work) not 
previously envisioned – confirmed one of the core observations that, as artsworkers 
ourselves, we have seen in our own and others’ arts-based experiences.  That is, that quality 
arts-based peacebuilding (of the integrative type discussed above) is more about raising 
possibility than confirming probability (terms borrowed from arts educator, Gallagher 
(2000)).  Making art, by its very definition, is a generative act: creating that which does not 
yet exist.  Building peace, it could be equally argued, does the same.  Our study participants’ 
self-directed attention and description of “what happened next” wasn’t always necessarily 
expected or predetermined, yet it held significance as a mark of impact and success.   
How then can evaluation processes and reports – which seek to document, account 
for, and communicate the value of such activity – capture these possibility-raising 
characteristics?   
We suggest an augmentation to conventional evaluation practices to more 
appropriately value and communicate the quality of emergence in such work.  This is not 
solely about advocating for more new systems-based models of evaluation, but to add a 
further evaluative frame specifically for arts-based work.  This is a frame that would capture 
the multidimensional nature of making art (which by its nature is emergent and generative) 
with an understanding of its situated influences (from and on political, cultural, social 
meaning-making) and generative impacts (such as what happens next).  This means placing 
equal value on effects and impacts both within the original scope of the project’s aims and 
beyond.  It means focusing more attention on how arts-based work engages with possibility; 
giving weight to outcomes that, in Lederach’s terms, may not yet exist (Lederach, 2005). 
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We suggest a framing devised with four key questions for processes of evidence-
gathering and analysis:  (i) What was intended?  (ii) What emerged?  (iii) What insights were 
gained?  (iv) What happened next?  Such questions may be posed by stakeholders, 
participants and/or independent third party evaluators during and after project 
implementation.  They are also questions that, depending on the time and human resources 
available, may be asked separately within the domains of social, political, cultural and 
aesthetic systems of meaning.  For instance, to ask these questions of the Pacific Arts Film 
Festival, with the social domain, such a framework may reveal (hypothetically) that (i) while 
there was some intention on the part of the organisers for social interaction among different 
cultural groups in the region; (ii) what emerged were disparate or individualised 
representations of Pacific Islands cultures in the films themselves.  This may have provided 
(iii) further insight into the social dimensions of peacebuilding in the region; and (iv) lead to 
further incentives to support cross-cultural arts opportunities or lead to further public debate 
about nationhood.  As a hypothetical example, we are not suggesting these are true of the 
2012 Festival, but through this hypothesising we draw attention to how analysis of arts-based 
work in this way can provide more nuanced detail and communication of the complex value 
and situatedness of the arts activity itself.   
It is important to note that these framework questions are raised here not as an 
alternative model for evaluation but as a gesture toward letting practice speak.  It is an as yet 
untested schema that we hope may challenge prevailing assumptions about the arts only as 
instrumental (a “vehicle” or “communication tool”) to achieving other goals, caged solely in 
development or peacebuilding terms.  The questions we envisage are intended to sharpen 
documentation and analysis of the actual art at the centre of arts-based peacebuilding, and 
acknowledge that the arts represent and contribute to complex processes of social, political, 
cultural and aesthetic meaning-making.  The arts cannot exist solely as an instrument or 
method only.  The framework could also be adapted to promote active implementer, 
stakeholder and participant involvement in evaluation, simply by having each ask and answer 
these questions of each other.  Like any evaluation task, individual project scale and 
resources will determine the level of detail captured, the kind of methodologies employed, 
and the time available to gather data and analyse each of these questions.  However, we 
believe this humanities-inflected framework, even in its minimal form, would invite more 
nuanced appreciation and understanding of the arts and their symbiotic relation to culture, 
society, politics, history, conflict and peace in any particular setting.  
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 21, Number 2 
131 
It is important to avoid evaluation measures and methods based on generalised 
assumptions that the arts are “good”.  Rather, such a proposed schema may be used to both 
account for and assess an arts activity’s relevance and impact in the complex social, cultural 
and political systems of meaning and value in which it takes place.  It is a schema that may 
problematize commonplace assumptions that an activity’s worth is best measured solely by 
its achievement of predetermined goals.  However, part of the very value of working with arts 
at all in such development and peacebuilding settings is that it can often and boldly defy 
common assumptions at all.    
Conclusion  
This small scoping study has suggested that there is a gap between policy and practice 
when it comes to understanding and valuing the complexity and potential of the arts in 
international development and peacebuilding.  While there is a perception that the arts are 
“good” and that they can function well in development contexts as a tool for communication 
and for social enterprise, we found that there are many other ways in which arts activities 
function as a practice and measure of peacebuilding.  Field practitioners, working in 
partnership with local communities, bring a nuanced understanding of multi-layered outputs, 
outcomes and impacts of arts-based work, yet it is often only through evaluation reports that 
such meaning is communicated to those managing and funding such activity, in the 
international aid arena in our region at least.  Given the importance of evaluation for making 
meaning of practice for wider audiences, attention must be given to more relevant approaches 
to communicating the value of arts-based peacebuilding through evaluation and reporting.  
We have suggested that a reframing is needed to allow for the equivalent valuing of intention 
and emergence – a schema that promotes evidence-gathering and analysis that clearly centres 
and links the arts practice to its situated contexts and values (in social, political, cultural, and 
aesthetic domains).  Such a framing could augment conventional means of evaluation, while 
at the same time better value the complexity of the arts when applied in such settings.   
What further questions, then, does a proposed reframing of the paradigms and 
methods of evaluation raise when it comes to arts-based peacebuilding?  Firstly, given the 
complementarity of the arts and peacebuilding in terms of their generative capacities (the 
desire to achieve outcomes that do not yet exist), what can the fields of arts evaluation and 
peacebuilding evaluation learn from and with each other?  While there are international 
communities of practice investigating similar concerns (Acting Together, 2011; Beausoleil, 
2012; Blum, 2011), our particular interest is in how current research into systems thinking, 
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participatory practices, and interdisciplinary processes of evaluation could contribute to better 
understanding not only of evaluation but of the practices of arts-based peacebuilding 
themselves.  Secondly, how could more iterative action-research evaluation paradigms in 
arts-based peacebuilding be encouraged in ways that avoid the high-cost resourcing usually 
required to implement?  And, thirdly, how might arts-based methods of data collection and 
analysis – methods that more explicitly seek to capture affect than effect – be employed to 
make evaluation in arts-based peacebuilding more authentic and appropriate to the nature of 
the work itself?    
The very term “creative practice” infers the generation of something new – whether 
that be a new experience, new future, new perspective or new artefact.  We suggest that “the 
good” of engaging with the arts – whether as a participant, audience member, implementer, 
or stakeholder – is about generating new ways of knowing and new avenues for “what 
happens next”; regardless of whether “what happens next” is a preconceived intended 
outcome or is arrived upon in an emergent process of meaning-making.  It appears from 
available documentation of diverse arts-based peacebuilding work, that one of the benefits of 
working with the arts is the capacity to enable conflict-affected communities to become alive 
to the idea of possibility.  To return to the provocations of Thompson which began this paper, 
this is as much about affect as effect.  As a field, we continue to struggle with the question of 
how this gets valued and measured.  One step toward addressing this is to redirect attention to 
the qualities and characteristics of artmaking itself in all its diversity, situatedness, and 
emergence that is difficult to capture and measure by conventional means.  By partnering 
with scholarly and practice communities in peacebuilding, the arts, and evaluation more 
broadly, we suggest that a re-framing of evaluation when it comes to arts-based 
peacebuilding could be possible: the implementation of new paradigms that will more 
appropriately value and communicate the generative capacities of both making and building 
that the very term “arts-based peacebuilding” implies.  
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Studying Diplomatic Negotiations: Integrating the Personal and Institutional Aspects 
Egle Murauskaite 
 
Abstract 
Following the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991, the Arms Control and 
Regional Security (ACRS) working group was launched as the first and so far only official 
regional arms control negotiations. While there have been multiple attempts to distil the 
lessons of the ACRS process, the aspect of events most conducive to forging trust between 
the negotiators and their inter-personal dynamics has never been explored. This paper takes 
an inter-disciplinary approach to studying negotiations: it zooms in on the ACRS process, 
integrating Middle East studies, decision making processes and nonproliferation literature 
with negotiations theory and oral history techniques, in the first attempt at a more 
comprehensive methodology to one of the highlights in the modern Middle Eastern 
diplomacy. To convey the multiple vantage points of participants, a three-stage 
methodological process is discussed: individual interviews with negotiating team members 
and facilitators, followed by group interviews of national delegations, and finally, a group 
session with representatives from each delegation. Ultimately, this model helps preserve a 
more accurate historical account, and significantly complements the technical insights on the 
negotiation dynamics with unexpected inter-personal relations angles, assisting in the design 
of more promising future frameworks. 
 
Introduction 
This paper presents a new methodological approach developed for a two-year oral 
history study of the Arms Control Regional Security Working Group (ACRS), a multilateral 
official negotiations track launched at the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991. 
Much of the literature on conflict studies and negotiations in general, and the long years of 
the Middle East Peace Process in particular, has tended to readily accept negotiators as sterile 
representatives of national interests, with scarce attention to their personal traits or 
institutional background. Subsequently, this study focuses on personal perspectives of the 
ACRS participants, and the impact of inter-personal and inter-institutional dynamics on the 
process. It draws on a diverse spectrum of practices of oral history, integrated with insights 
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from studies of negotiation behavior, offering a new methodological contribution to help 
bridge the divide between different disciplines, and between theory and practice. The study 
complements the prevailing approach to exploring negotiation dynamics on the state level 
(which, in case of ACRS, is now relatively well understood) with additional levels of analysis 
on institutional decision-making and relevant personal aspects, painting a more 
comprehensive picture of these historic events. With no official record of the ACRS 
negotiations, and a new generation of arms control experts yet to emerge in the Middle East, 
the project, for which the methodology discussed in this paper was developed, will be able to 
offer guidance for setting up more successful future frameworks for negotiating Middle East 
security. 
The paper starts with a brief background on the ACRS process, introducing the 
methodological approach designed for this study. The second section reviews the practices in 
oral history that have laid the groundwork for this methodology. The third and fourth sections 
proceed to discuss the relevant theoretical frameworks in negotiation behavior and 
institutional decision making processes, which are subsequently tested for explanatory power 
for the ACRS case during the interviews with former negotiators. The fifth section follows 
with a brief discussion of the inherent limitations of the chosen research methods, and some 
of the remedies available to address them. The final section discusses preliminary findings 
from the interviews conducted to date. 
ACRS as a Case Study 
The Arms Control Regional Security Working Group (ACRS) has so far been the 
only official multilateral security dialogue and framework in the Middle East concerning 
WMD control and nonproliferation. ACRS was established as part of the Arab-Israeli 
multilateral peace process initiated at the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991. The 
ACRS group held six plenary sessions and many other conceptual and thematic meetings 
between 1992 and 1995. By 1995, complications in the Peace Process, the 1995 Review and 
Extension Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
and the ongoing disagreement between Israel and Egypt over when, where, and how to 
discuss the nuclear issue, all contributed to the ACRS talks being put on hold indefinitely 
(Landau, 2008). 
Nevertheless, ACRS achieved important understandings, including draft Declaration 
of Principles and Statements of Intent on Arms Control and Regional Security, draft charter 
for regional security centers, as well as procedures for pre-notification of certain military 
Peace and Conflict Studies 
Volume 21, Number 2 
137 
activities and exchange of military information. At the same time the failure of ACRS also 
revealed the deep disagreements between Egypt (which took upon itself to represent the Arab 
position) and Israel on priorities, the sequencing of the Peace Process versus WMDFZ 
negotiations, threat perceptions, and the nuclear issue. The process also deepened mistrust 
and rivalries among various Arab states (Kane & Murauskaite, 2014). 
While much has been written about the ACRS process, its achievements, and reasons 
for its failure, not a single study has been written by those who negotiated the process. In fact, 
no account has ever been written of the decision making processes in the lead up to and 
during the negotiations, or the events most conducive to the negotiations, and most helpful in 
forging personal relationships and trust between the negotiators. Nevertheless, with consistent 
emphasis on confidence building measures in the literature analyzing ACRS content, the role 
of inter-personal dynamics, trust and good faith – or lack of thereof – held great potential 
significance. Yet, with no official record of these negotiations, memories of the participants, 
many of whom are already in their late seventies, are the last remaining trace of this 
significant chapter in the Middle East Peace Process. 
ACRS lends itself well to case study methodology, being a unique and significant 
component of the Middle East Peace Process, with a less abstract content focus, a clear start 
and finish date, and a relatively small and consistent group of people involved. These 
specifics make it knowable in a more comprehensive manner than other aspects of the 
process, or the Peace Process as a whole. Yet, many of the insights associated with 
personality impact and dynamics, are still externally generalizable and have value for similar 
future efforts in the region. 
This is the first attempt to gather the ACRS Working Group participants’ memories, 
commentaries, recollections, perspectives, interpretations, and accounts of events and 
experiences during the negotiations. The broad objectives behind this approach are to better 
understand what happened; offer rare insights into individuals and states’ decision-making 
processes; identify differences based on cultural values and perspectives; verify or explain 
contested events or decisions from multiple perspectives; transmit experiences to the future 
generation of negotiators and regional policy makers; and identify areas that require special 
care or consideration in future negotiations. 
In this study of regional conflict negotiations, an inter-disciplinary approach was 
adopted, integrating Middle East studies, decision making processes, and nonproliferation 
literature with negotiations theory and oral history techniques, in the first attempt at a more 
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comprehensive methodology to one of the most significant but least studied events in the 
modern Middle Eastern diplomatic history.  
The project was divided into three stages of interviews, complemented with personal 
notes of the participants, as well as archival materials of the period in question for canvassing 
a more accurate and comprehensive backdrop. In the first stage, members of the region’s 
negotiating teams and facilitators were interviewed individually about their personal 
experiences and roles during the negotiations, and the events that, often unwittingly, became 
the pivotal points. In preparation for this stage, each interviewee was asked to write a brief, 
mainly to be used to refresh the memories, as almost 20 years have passed since the discussed 
events. The second stage brought together small groups of individuals, who had served 
together on their state delegations, clarifying common and diverging interpretations as they 
become apparent, reflective of national inter-institution dynamics. The third stage unfolds as 
a joint session with one or two representatives from each delegation, where participants 
collectively revisit some of the key experiences identified in the previous stages, and get to 
compare notes across the national lines. This multi-layered methodological approach allows 
telling the story of a particular negotiating process from multiple vantage points – the 
individuals, their organizations, national delegations, and the process as a whole. The 
following sections detail the body of scholarship that this methodology was built around, 
explaining the aspects the model draws on, with the limitations of the chosen approach 
addressed in section five. 
Drawing on Oral History Practices in Conflict Studies 
Oral history as a methodology can bring to light hidden aspects of a past event, 
facilitating a sense of closure on issues not adequately remembered or dealt with. 
Methodologically, oral history practices have been successfully applied to studying arms 
control negotiations in cases of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, USA-UK 
1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, the negotiations between the USA, Canada, and Romania 
in the 1960s on nuclear energy cooperation, and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Blight, 2003; 
Daalder & Destler, 2000; Gheorghe, 2013; Haley, 2002). With efforts to revive the Middle 
East Peace Process in general, and regional arms control negotiations in particular, revisiting 
the ACRS story from this innovative angle can also assist in developing recommendations 
and offer insights to future negotiators. Indeed, identifying and clarifying common and 
diverging interpretations of events, and helping explain the thoughts and reasons behind 
actions, is significant in moving forward, as many of these underlying realities remain 
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painfully acute, and individuals in question still play a central role. In preparation for this 
project, the researchers consulted with three institutions that use oral history as part of their 
methodology. 
The USA Marine Corps (USMC) routinely uses oral history interviews to capture the 
personal narratives of active duty and reserve marines recently returned from overseas 
deployments, alongside the broader historical record of events that the Corps maintains. The 
Marine Corps History Division has an Oral History Program dedicated for this task in 
Quantico, VA, where officers are trained in this technique, and subsequently dispatched to 
conduct individual interviews with their fellow marines, using a standard manual. Each 
interview session is usually conducted on one-on-one basis and lasts from 45 minutes to an 
hour. Shared institutional background and relatable experiences between the interviewer and 
interviewee are conducive to quick development of rapport, and the interviewees tend to be 
forthcoming with information, assured it would not be shared with their superiors or used in a 
way that could adversely impact their stance (J. L. Rossiter, personal communication, May 1, 
2013). The interviewees consent for the recorded information to be used for the Marine Corps 
internally and it is rarely if ever released to the wider public verbatim, but the History 
division regularly uses these insights, anonymized and pooled, in its publications. 
These brief frank interactions in familiar surroundings, usually shortly after the events in 
question have occurred, represent one end of the spectrum – a routine emphasizing personal 
experiences in events, the significance of which is usually yet to transpire. Further down this 
spectrum are oral history practices employed to study events of historic importance that have 
occurred in the distant past, with the explicit purpose of preserving this record for the general 
public. Parts of taped interviews from several participants are usually combined to shed light 
on less known aspects of generally widely studied events. The Marine Corps Oral History 
Program, for instance, used this methodology to interview the veterans of Korean and 
Vietnam wars. 
Another step further down this spectrum of oral history practices are extended multi-
day interview sessions with one individual and a team of interviewers, used by historians to 
finesse details of somewhat controversial or less well-understood events that had occurred in 
the distant past. In preparation for the interview, a file is assembled based on publicly 
available documents, detailing the sequence of events in question (such as newspaper articles 
or relevant leadership statements) to provide somewhat objective and contextualized anchors 
to the interview, and prompt the subject’s memory. For instance, scholars with the USA 
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Institute for Defense Analysis have used this technique to individually interview Iraqi 
generals, who had served under Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, seeking their 
personal insights and the Iraqi military perspectives on the events of that period (Woods, 
Murray, Holaday, &  Elkhamri, 2009; Woods, Murray, Nathan, Sabara,  & Venegas, 2011). 
The team travelled to the Middle East to meet these veterans, usually spending around three 
days with each interviewee: the first day was used to build some personal rapport, moving 
through a series of increasingly detailed questions over the next day or day and a half, and 
using the remainder of the third day to rehash or clarify issues raised during these 
conversations. Kevin Woods (author interview, April 18, 2013, Washington, D.C.) described 
these intensive sessions as physically taxing to both, the interviewers and interviewees, 
requiring regular breaks to rekindle attention, and noted the challenges of communicating 
through an interpreter, as well as talking across cultural boundaries (USA-Iraq; civilian-
military; English-Arabic). The scholars have also noted that interviewees who were 
physically in different places at the time of the event in question (e.g. an air force pilot and a 
ground forces commander during the same battle), and thus had different but not directly 
conflicting narratives, were much more forthcoming with the information, compared to those 
who had lived through the experiences under scrutiny “shoulder to shoulder.” 
At the other end of the spectrum is critical oral history methodology. Namely, in 
mixed group interview sessions an inter-disciplinary group of scholars engages in a 
moderated discussion with a group of interviewees with diverse backgrounds, who had 
participated in an historical event, bringing different vantage points. The reference document 
package that the interviewers prepare includes declassified documents and more personalized 
records, such as letters, memos or transcripts from conversations, and the two groups interact 
over several days in a series of roundtables or seminars aimed at clarifying various aspects of 
the event. A representative example of employing critical oral history technique is a project 
exploring the roots of USA-Iranian enmity, where a group of international relations scholars 
and lead figures from the National Security Archive engaged with CIA veterans and former 
USA diplomats on the subject (Blight, Lang, Banai, Byrne, & Tirman, 2012). Another 
example is critical oral history series held at the Woodrow Wilson Center, such as an oral 
history of the Cuban Missiles Crisis and US-South Korea relations. In the latter, fifteen 
international relations scholars from the USA and the Republic of Korea (ROK), together 
with former ROK and USA officials, explore the interactions with and within the Korean 
Peninsula during the Cold War (Ostermann & Person, 2011). 
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Building on these practices, oral history methodology was optimized for interviewing 
international diplomats about their experiences during a past negotiation. Most interviewees 
were Western-educated and all of them spoke English (the ACRS negotiations were 
conducted in English). At the same time, whilst less constrained by language and cultural 
barriers, temporal constraints was a very real issue. Given the high positions of the 
interviewees (e.g. former prime minster or current foreign minister), they were able to spare 
no more than a few hours at a time, after rigorous planning. Scheduling individual sessions 
for 1.5-3 hours in length, and proceeding with group sessions of approximately half-day long, 
offered a balanced approach in this respect. The third stage of the project, a two-day 
conference based on the critical oral history model, was also designed to be shorter: with the 
first two stages of interviews laying substantive groundwork, it was intended as a narrative 
comparison session, instead of being the primary venue for raising the critical points. 
Another challenge in arranging the interviews proved to be logistics. Namely, best 
practices in oral history suggest meeting the interviewees in their familiar environment, as a 
gesture promoting openness and putting them at ease. However, with most Middle East 
delegates still based in the region, the tumultuous environment limited the number of 
locations conducive to interview meetings for security reasons. Similarly, factors pertaining 
to current regional dynamics also presented challenges in locating some of the former ACRS 
participants: with 48 delegates identified through literature review and personal consultations, 
it was possible to contact 20 individuals and schedule interviews with 15 of them, with more 
interviews expected to follow over the next 4 months. 
Prior to meeting for the initial individual sessions, the interviewees were briefed about 
the project, and asked to review any personal notes or documents they may have kept from 
the negotiations to rekindle the memory. Many interviewees have subsequently agreed to 
share this material, and that became a significant compliment to the background 
compendium, consisting of a detailed timetable of the process, source documents from the 
negotiations, available media reports from the period, and scholarly literature analyzing the 
process of negotiations retrospectively from the external observer point of view. For the study 
of the ACRS process, this proved particularly insightful, as these negotiations, from the very 
start, were conducted under the agreement that no official record would be kept. Furthermore, 
the author has filed requests under the USA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) with The 
George Bush Presidential Library, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, and the USA 
Department of State, to make publicly available previously unreleased records of reports on 
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consultations prior and following the meetings, phone conversations, as well as relevant 
notes, internal memos, reports and correspondence. Whilst the nature of these records is 
somewhat USA-centric, it offers important insights into the overall dynamics of a process 
that the USA was trying to facilitate, with particularly informative records of phone 
conversations between USA and Middle East leaders and diplomats. 
The proposed focus of the interviews on inter-personal experiences and inter-
organizational dynamics had initially surprised many of the ACRS delegates contacted for the 
project. As discussed above, the traditional approach to studying various aspects of the 
Middle East Peace Process had been primarily state-centric content-focused, with few 
personal anecdotes, occasionally found in the literature, recalled when emphasizing a point 
(Baker, 1995, pp. 454-455). Nonetheless, the former ACRS participants proved surprisingly 
frank in the interviews, eagerly sharing their personal perspectives on the interplays among 
the fellow negotiators on their team, as well as with their regional counterparts. The aspect of 
inter-personal dynamics proved particularly significant, since the composition of national 
teams has changed little during more than four years of the negotiating process, and the small 
community of international arms control experts meant they have been interacting repeatedly 
in this, as well as other forums. 
Incorporating Aspects of Negotiation Behavior Studies 
A common method for social scientists to test theories and models of interpersonal 
conflict negotiations is through behavioral laboratory experiments with volunteers, usually 
simulating situations relevant to business relations. To the best of the author’s knowledge, 
none of the previous studies using oral history interviews have attempted to integrate such 
insights into their methodology through question design or interview analysis. Druckman’s 
(1973, 1983) research offers a rare example of sociology and behavioral research models 
applied to analyze international post-conflict negotiations. Subsequently, this study looks to 
bridge the gap between disciplinary methodological practices, using quantitatively tested lab 
models as prompts in a qualitative study with first-hand participants of historical events. 
Studies of trust in negotiations are particularly relevant: introducing regional parties to each 
other through various semi-formal (Track 1.5) and informal (Track 2) initiatives, and 
bringing the discourse from abstract concepts to inter-personal interactions among 
counterparts, have long formed the facilitation backdrop for the Middle East Peace Process, 
with success depending in no small part on the compatibility of personalities at the table. On 
inter-state level of analysis, confidence building measures have become an integral part of the 
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process – but ultimately, these measures also start with a network of persons, who have 
confidence in their professional counterparts, and only gradually can that trust be embedded 
in the states they represent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firstly, relevant frameworks for understand the atmosphere at the outset of the 
negotiations are reviewed by Lewicki, Tomlinson and Gillespie (2006), suggesting that 
parties start with surprisingly high levels of trust, absent prior information that would 
encourage them to act otherwise, and gradually move towards higher levels of trust and/or 
distrust, depending on their experience in repeated interactions. Meanwhile, in conflict 
studies, the implicit assumption is that parties arrive at a negotiating table with mutual 
feelings of animosity, i.e. that the violent conflict, ongoing or suspended for the duration of 
these negotiations, would act as such prior information, negatively predisposing the parties 
towards each other personally. In light of the violent conflicts in the Middle East preceding 
the ACRS negotiations, and the sensitivity of the subject of weapons of mass destruction, the 
interviewees were prompted to recall any prior interactions they had with their counterparts, 
the first impressions, and the initial atmosphere at the working group, looking for cues about 
whether and how those aspects shifted during the nearly five years of repeated encounters. 
Irmer and Druckman (2009) have put Lewicki’s model of trust development to a test, using 
quantitative methods to code textual inferences drawn from literature describing negotiations 
processes. The qualitative approach to integrating conflict studies and sociology literature in 
this study complements the abovementioned research with first-hand accounts of participants 
collected through semi-structured interviews. 
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Secondly, for understanding drivers of progress in negotiations, sociological studies 
of conflict transformation are helpful in thinking about the points of inflection, moving the 
process forward or stalling it instead. Based on Linda L. Putnam’s research review (2004, 
pp. 277-278, 283), the process of negotiation can be transformed along two dimensions: first, 
the level of abstraction may shift, in terms of the content of the talks, and second, the depth 
and quality of the personal bond between the negotiators may change (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, it is important to appreciate that the impact of these inflection points, 
signifying change in the inter-personal relations or content focus of a negotiation, can often 
only be understood as productive or counterproductive in retrospect. Frank J. Barett (2004, p. 
214) and Irving Seidman (2013, pp. 17-19) have also acknowledged the skepticism of many 
in the field with regards to the ability of negotiators to recognize a critical moment as it 
occurs – rather than retrospectively. These insights have prompted the search in this study for 
the multitude of critical events throughout the ACRS process that could suggest attempts at 
such process transformations, and also to prompt the interviewees directly as to whether 
certain insights had occurred to them in real time or transpired in retrospect, consulting the 
participants’ own notes from the period in question when available. 
Thirdly, it is important to consider the impact of cultural differences on inter-personal 
dynamics. It has been suggested that negotiators from diverse cultural backgrounds likely 
come to the table attaching differing levels of significance to verbal agreements (Friedman, 
Yi-Hong, & Simons, 2013), and varying levels of propensity to search for win-win (as 
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opposed to winner-take-all) solutions (Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Brett, Tinsley, & Weingart, 
2012), potentially leading to miscommunications and overall sub-optimal results of 
interaction. Behavioral studies of negotiation dynamics in business settings have also 
explored the persistence and impact of cultural stereotyping (Tinsley, Turan, Weingart, & 
Dillon-Merrill, 2012, pp. 272-274), and it is worth seeing how these aspects play out in 
diplomatic negotiations. Cofman-Wittes (2005) has studied the interplay of cultural factors in 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, but broader regional research in this domain remains scarce. 
In case of ACRS, whilst parties from the Middle East would have been abreast of the 
neighbourhood cultural and political dynamics, their limited official diplomatic interactions 
may have given them little indication of how these factors play out in practice at the 
negotiating table; for Western diplomats the reverse may have been the case – more direct 
bilateral interactions with the parties, but less practical comprehension of regional realities on 
the ground. Subsequently, the former ACRS negotiators were prompted to recall the general 
level of cultural awareness amongst their colleagues and counterparts, as well as previous 
experiences they may have had of cross-cultural negotiations. 
It is also worth noting that few contemporary behavioral studies of negotiations 
include individuals from the Middle East in their samples, with the contrasts between Asian 
and North American styles of negotiation as the more common research focus. Therefore, the 
insights of former ACRS participants from places like Israel, Egypt, and Jordan may offer 
new perspectives to the ongoing studies and future negotiations in this field. 
Inter-Agency Decision-Making Dynamics in Arms Control 
Studies exploring state decisions to acquire or renounce weapons of mass destruction 
frequently turn to the bureaucratic politics framework as part of the explanation, but similar 
approach has so far not been applied to studying the ACRS process. The institutional factor is 
important to consider, first, as a formative background influencer of the negotiators, and 
second, as a systemic indicator of the different bureaucratic arrangements for handling these 
arms control negotiations in participating states. Relevant models detailing organizational 
behavior are drawn upon in an effort to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the 
ACRS negotiations. 
The literature detailing decision-making and influence over nuclear weapons issues 
considers three institutional categories of particular relevance: the national nuclear energy 
establishment, significant units in the military, and the political apparatus (Sagan, 1996-
1997). For the study of ACRS negotiations, the first category is expanded to include technical 
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experts from a broader range of relevant backgrounds (e.g. missile or other WMD programs), 
and the third category is further divided into country leaders, foreign affairs experts, and 
(lower level) civil servants. The inter-institutional dynamics came into play by socializing the 
relevant groups of experts and influencers in the discourse of arms control through 
educational seminars, dialogue, and identifying the agreed confidence building measures. In 
addition, inclusion of persons with military background into some of the negotiating teams 
created potential for civil-military institutional background clashes. 
In his seminal work on institutional decision-making, Graham Allison (1971, pp. 67-
96) postulates that organizations follow a fixed set of actions to perform complex tasks, with 
their own survival and advancement as the top priority, and are subsequently able to produce 
only a limited range of responses to any given problem – inbuilt biases not always 
immediately obvious to outsiders. James J. Walsh (2000) has found institutional factors to be 
the most significant in explaining nuclear nonproliferation decisions, after testing a range of 
alternatives pertinent to security and normative environment: modifying Allison’s classical 
theory slightly, Walsh nevertheless underlines the importance of identifying the institution 
that stands to gain from such a significant national policy change. However, it is not clear 
whether, to set the disarmament talks (and process) in motion, the factors that have initially 
driven certain institutions to become proponents of pursuing WMDs would have to be 
reversed, e.g., as was the case in South Africa, or whether a rival institution would have to 
emerge with goals inconsistent with such a pursuit and challenge that incumbent, as was the 
case in Brazil and Argentina (for an overview of explanations of nuclear reversals, see 
Mueller & Schmidt, 2010; Paul, 2000). Subsequently, during the interview process, the 
author attempted to distinguish institutional level drivers of the ACRS talks, and identify 
evolving institutional approaches to ACRS, in light of their traditional operating dynamics.  
National government profile has also been considered among the leading explanations 
of state propensity to pursue weapons of mass destruction or disarm (if one presumes the 
reversal of the original drivers would allow the space for starting a dialogue on disarmament) 
– with assessed characteristics being the relative depth of democratic institutional culture, and 
international political and economic integration (Hymans, 2012; Solingen, 2012). These 
factors significantly affect the audience costs, domestic and/or international, that the 
leadership would incur in making such decisions. Regional security negotiations concerning 
the most strategic armaments arguably had the potential to start generating audience costs on 
institutional level (for instance, consider Saddam Hussein’s misleading behavior regarding 
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Iraq’s WMD capabilities leading to the 2003 war). In addition, existing and developing 
contacts between corresponding agencies of negotiating states would affect the ease with 
which international influence could be exerted over domestic bureaucratic apparatus. 
Furthermore, greater national inter-agency coordination necessitated by the ACRS process 
around the specific set of issues at hand could potentially extend the range of such external 
influence of any institution by effectively transmitting it over a newly formed domestic web 
of relations, rather than being limited to a single nod of the corresponding agency. These 
factors form an illustrative background for understanding the dynamics within national 
ACRS delegations, explored during the second stage of interviews in this project. 
Leadership susceptibility to public opinion pressure has often added complications to 
the Middle East Peace Process talks, but as the ACRS talks unfolded in a separate, more 
isolated domain, with negotiators several levels removed from the highly visible top 
leadership, an interesting insight to consider is whether this increased the relative significance 
of the institutional level traits (over personal or state level). Although country leaders still 
were the ones to make the final decisions in ACRS, their involvement in the negotiating 
process was rather limited (in contrast to the talks during the Peace Process), having 
instructed their national negotiators in broad terms. The technical nature of discussions would 
have also made it accessible to a much smaller public audience, especially given that many of 
the negotiators had to be themselves gradually educated on the matter, potentially creating 
more leeway by further reducing public pressure. 
Another important factor to consider is the civil-military institutional dynamics. For 
instance, Israel’s tradition of particularly close civil-military bureaucracies in a democratic 
setting would have posed a curious challenge to the Arab state representatives, where a strong 
military establishment did not typically coexist with an effective and powerful civilian 
political structure - the nature of their previous domestic experience of civil-military 
interaction would have been radically different. Moreover, the measures and exercises agreed 
through the ACRS process would have required closer domestic cooperation between the 
civil-military structures, as well as the technical experts, and it is interesting to analyze the 
potential impact of ACRS to alter power relations between these domestic institutions. For 
instance, Barry Posen (1984, pp. 56-75) posits that as the probability of armed conflict 
declines, military structures conform more closely to predictions of organizational behavior 
theory, and also – that growing security concerns prompt increased civilian efforts of 
oversight over the military establishment. Since the ACRS process was intended to gradually 
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improve the regional security environment, it is curious to observe whether any of these 
effects on inter-agency relations could be observed as it unfolded. 
Methodological Limitations and Proposed Remedies 
Some of the common critiques of the interview and oral history methodologies stem 
from the nature of verbal and textual information as a credible modicum. Questions surround 
individual’s general ability to accurately convey their inner experiences or events they have 
witnessed through a verbal exchange process of an interview (Hammersley, 2008). The 
primary focus of the interviews was the personal narratives of interviewees, rather than the 
search for absolute historical truths, as is characteristic for phenomenological interviewing 
(Roulston, 2010, pp. 16-29). This was also helpful in addressing the challenge of accuracy 
when discussing the events that occurred some twenty years earlier –a detailed timeline of 
key factual events was maintained for reference purposes, but focused on memories of 
emotions and perceptions, which individuals seemed to have a better recollection of. 
While it was important to avoid giving the interviewees an impression that they are 
being judged and ought to offer a justification for thoughts and actions they describe, the 
second and third layer of group interviews were added in an attempt to qualify these 
individual experiences through a collective history filter. In the second layer of national 
delegation interviews, that had to be weighed against the participants’ level of comfort to 
speak frankly in the presence of their former (or current) superiors and colleagues, especially 
since they experienced these events together, so diverging recollections could suggest direct 
confrontation. The third layer of interviews, with representatives from each delegation 
brought together, presented challenges in depicting divergent perceptions within teams or 
delegations – inviting particular representatives risked validating their narrative in the eyes of 
fellow participants as the discussion moved ahead. 
A subsequent set of concerns relates to the use of language and terminology. Namely, 
the selection of language to conduct the interviews in may influence the interviewee’s speech 
patterns and choice of vocabulary, as well as their interpretation. For this project, all 
interviews were conducted in English – a language all participants were fluent in, but many 
were not native speakers. Similarly, a cautionary note is needed for the terminology used in 
this interdisciplinary research project: different academic fields tended to used different terms 
to refer to the same issue at hand, and vice versa. In addition, the effort to make this project 
accessible and useful to both, academic and policy practitioner audiences also influenced the 
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terminology choices. Nevertheless, it must be noted that all the interviewees were from the 
field of nonproliferation and shared understanding of the discussed terms.  
Finally, the reliability of the interview process could be challenged on the basis of that 
the interviewer, as the medium eliciting and capturing responses, influences responses as the 
information requested is channeled through him or her. While this is a general concern, 
following consultations about the best interview practices with other scholars, each interview 
was conducted in the consistent team of two, with interviewers taking turns in leading the 
question process, and taking notes independently, as well as tape recording the interviews. In 
turn, some interviewees got more reserved when the conversations were taped, choosing their 
words more carefully and noticeably filtering their responses, despite being promised 
anonymity. 
Preliminary Insights from Individual Interviews 
At the time of writing, stage two of collective delegation interviews was in progress, 
and the final joint session was yet to be held, but the first stage of individual interviews, 
together with newly available primary source information, have already produced significant 
preliminary insights, briefly discussed below. 
First, the interviewees shared their insights about the personalities on their national 
teams, as well as regional counterparts, with surprising frankness. With the promise of non-
attribution, elaborate pictures were quickly presented of the characters that played the leading 
roles throughout the ACRS process – whereas discussions of national inter-organizational 
dynamics were slightly more formalized and assessments – more ambiguous. Furthermore, 
the interviewees frequently pointed out the contrasting personalities of the lead Egyptian and 
Israeli negotiators, and, more importantly, their contrarian inter-personal dynamics, as major 
obstacles for building trust.  
Second, testing the theoretical frameworks on trust building proved challenging: it 
turned out that many lead ACRS participants knew each other before the process had started 
from previous interactions in diplomatic forums of New York and Geneva, as well as USA-
Israel Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) and brought a certain level of trust (or rather 
distrust) to the table. Indeed, it transpired that previous connections to parties in the region, as 
well as belonging to the small national communities of arms control professionals, were key 
to being selected to the ACRS delegations to begin with. Since the formative stage of these 
inter-personal dynamics had already unfolded, the interviewees recounted few episodes 
reflective of initial bonding, instead focusing on later stages of trust development. The parties 
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recalled naturally gravitating towards the persons they already knew; gradually increasing the 
levels of trust in these relations, whereas previously untrusted and unfamiliar parties 
continued their interactions at an arms-length. Whilst such behavior of seeking comfort in 
familiarity would generally hardly be surprising, the fact that this dynamic unfolded amongst 
highly skilled diplomats, changing little over the course of five years was somewhat 
unexpected and disconcerting. Interestingly, the bottom-up effect of trust building amongst 
lower-level staff being gradually channeled up the chain of command was also hardly 
discernable. 
Third, with regards to cultural aspects, it was not the lack of cultural awareness, but 
rather fundamental political disagreements that made it hard for the parties to connect and 
trust each other. Many recalled substantial initial reservations - to even shake hands, much 
less talk across the divide - which dissipated only marginally as the process unfolded. 
Nevertheless, the cultural and institutional factors surfaced in the different ways that the 
parties tended to (or not to) draw a line between national positions and actions in official 
capacity, and personal interactions. For instance, the negotiators recalled political frustrations 
exploding into personal animosities at times of heightened tension, and some felt cheated 
when a fellow negotiator they felt they were getting to know on a personal level would 
stubbornly stick to a national position counterproductive to the process. Overall, most 
participants expressed a preference for more directness in conduct of their counterparts, even 
when the content to be delivered was inevitably unpleasant. 
Fourth, the interviews revealed that the USA, the leader of the process, came to it with 
very limited objectives, namely, promoting a dialogue between the Arab states and Israel. 
Arms control turned out to be simply one of the issues at hand, largely selected following the 
recent success of the USA-USSR arms control agreement, and shred regional concerns over 
WMD programs revealed in Iraq. There was a marked disconnect between the national 
institutions that set the process in motion during the Madrid Conference and its implementers, 
as well as diverging views – amongst the participants, and between the USA and the regional 
parties, about the objectives of the process. 
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The Classroom as Peace Incubator: A US-Gaza Case Study   
Ian S. McIntosh and Jamil Alfaleet  
 
Abstract 
This paper describes the design, implementation, and lessons from a case study in 
transforming two university classrooms into what we call an international “peace incubator.” 
In the besieged Gaza Strip, opportunities for normalization of relations with Israel are almost 
non-existent, and there is very limited desire or personal capacity among the student 
population of Gaza to do the work of peace-building. A semester-long videoconference class 
linking IUPUI and Gaza University students sought to address this deficit by developing a 
model for building ties of friendship and cooperation. West Bank peace activist Juliano Mer 
Khamis once spoke of a coming Third Palestinian Intifada (or uprising) that would be 
mounted through art, music, poetry and film. Inspired by his dedication to long term peace-
building, we set about opening a channel of communication through our classroom 
experiment to allow the students to see beyond the negative stereotypes and allow friendship 
and understanding to flourish. Our experiment was designed to not only promote trust 
between US and Palestinian faculty and students, but to also creatively endorse Mer Khamis’ 
strategy for peace-building, and giving voice to those struggling to be heard.   
 
Introduction  
Since 2005, IUPUI (Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis) has been 
engaged in a multi-year project to examine whether virtual study abroad can replicate, in 
significant ways, a regular study abroad experience for its students. Learning from semester-
long experiments in virtual team-teaching with universities in Iran, Russia, Indonesia, and 
Macedonia, in 2012 anthropologist Ian McIntosh of IUPUI and political scientist Jamil 
Alfaleet from the newly established Gaza University (formerly the Gaza Women’s College), 
the authors of this paper, initiated the Gaza Visioning Project. Our goal was to explore the 
potential use of the university classroom as a tool for international peace-building. As a 
virtual study abroad experience that was focused on conflict resolution, we witnessed how the 
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shared coursework and activities were having a profound impact on our students. By bringing 
our classrooms into the international realm, and the international community into the 
university, we added an entirely new dimension to the student experience. In this paper, we 
present the major findings from the first year of our collaboration, including student 
appraisals, a review of the underlying theoretical perspectives, and also the logistical 
challenges, in a reflection on the significance of such an intervention in the longer-term 
search for peace and prosperity in the Middle East. 
In teaching anthropology we make a study of the rich diversity of the peoples of the 
world in the full expectation that in so doing, we will also be learning something about 
ourselves. We begin to see our own cultures with a fresh eye, a relativist’s eye, and we see 
our “American” culture for example – in its many forms – as but one iteration of a complex 
whole. This is also the case with peace studies. When we explore the ways in which conflict 
is being addressed in other places, especially in cases where contested narratives and 
demeaning stereotypes are a daily reality, it helps prepare our own students for thinking 
critically about the conflicts that they face in their own societies, and how they might 
constructively deal with them. There can be no long-lasting solution to our differences 
without dialog, and the university virtual classroom is an ideal place to hone our skills in 
international diplomacy, with each side benefiting from the encounter in their own unique 
ways.  
Project Context 
IUPUI sends approximately 1% of its student body on study abroad each year to 
multiple destinations but predominantly in Europe and East Asia. Out of 30,000 students, that 
is about ~ 300-400 students. IUPUI is a commuter campus. Many of the students commute to 
the class and an ever-increasing number are undertaking their classes online. They are 
parents, people working full-time jobs, or first generation students. IUPUI desires that all of 
its students have an international experience and, through the “RISE initiative” the university 
insists that all students graduate with at least one research, one international, or one service 
experience, and ideally all three. To facilitate such international research and service 
experiences, in 2005 IUPUI began an experiment with virtual study abroad with an emerging 
focus on conflict resolution and peace-building. What better way to challenge our students 
than to allow them an opportunity to reflect upon how in the US they might take for granted 
their freedom of speech, freedom of movement, and freedom from the threat of torture, and 
start to develop an empathy with those for whom these are not part of their daily lived 
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experience.  
In 2012, the authors of this paper created the Gaza Visioning Project and agreed upon 
a joint curriculum that focused on a search for the pathways to peace and prosperity in the 
Middle East. Our students would partner up across the great divide in this creative exercise 
and work together in developing novel solutions to the conflict between Palestine and Israel. 
They would not be hamstrung by past failures or thoughts of intractability, but open to all 
manner of solutions. By taking such an approach we found ourselves in an entirely new type 
of virtual study abroad experience. We decided to utilize the broader community as a 
teaching resource and, as we will explain, our classrooms were transformed into what we call 
a peace incubator. So we were not just trying to replicate the study abroad experience. Rather, 
we were embarking on something entirely new and exciting for the students, namely 
education and advocacy in the service of peace and cooperative development.  
The Roadmap 
Earlier in 2012, project co-leader Ian McIntosh had explored possible 
videoconference classes with Israel and, in conversation with IUPUI colleagues, the idea 
came forward for a three way class involving the US, Gaza and Israeli universities where the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be frankly discussed, and the pathways of peace explored. 
Unfortunately the timing for the Israel connection did not work but even if it had, Gaza 
counterparts were not enthused by the idea. While self-proclaimed peace activists, they were 
forthright in saying that Gaza was not yet ready for direct talks with Israel and that 
participants would come to understand their position over the duration of the class. So the 
focus became: How do we overcome such a stalemate and build capacity for making those 
vital connections that are so necessary for peace and reconciliation?  
The ideal structure for a peace classroom would have been to facilitate a three-way 
Skype conversation in which US students could act as mediators between students in both 
Gaza and Israel but suspicion was evident from the outset. Just several months before the 
class began, Jamil Alfaleet was quite open in saying that the idea of his students speaking to 
an American, a presumed Israeli proxy, was anathema. When selecting papers for the class, 
one by an expert on reconciliation, Dr. Zvi Bekerman from Hebrew University in Jerusalem, 
co-author of Teaching Contested Narratives (2012), was rejected. Such is the level of distrust 
towards their Israeli neighbors that Jamil Alfaleet doubted that the Gaza students would even 
open the attachment. And yet this was a paper focused on that handful of schools in Israel 
that are multicultural and multilingual and which actively promote coexistence between 
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Israelis and Palestinians.  
Dr. Alfaleet compared the situation in Gaza and the West Bank to that of African 
Americans in the Deep South in the 1960s, or to South African Blacks under Apartheid. So 
we could not underestimate the magnitude of the challenge. Even by conservative estimate, a 
very significant proportion of Gaza’s mostly poor and disaffected youth, have perhaps no 
greater desire or goal, or indeed opportunity, to be anything other than a martyr for their 
cause. Embittered, often traumatized, and hungry for justice, they are often drawn into the 
conflict in ways that are ultimately self-defeating and merely escalate tensions.   
In considering the range of options for the unfolding class, it was important to stay 
flexible. We decided to proceed with a Gaza-only focus in terms of the subject matter but as 
the semester progressed, Ian McIntosh added more and more Jewish and Israeli voices, 
including those advocating for a one-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, a two-state 
solution, and even a supporter of the continued stalemate, who wanted to see the peoples of 
the region solve the conflict in their own way and time without any outside intervention. So 
apart from regular weekly Skype communication with our Gaza professor, his colleagues, and 
our students, Ian McIntosh connected his US students via videoconference with the 
aforementioned Hebrew University professor, with members of the peace-focused “J Street” 
group, and others. As part of this class, not only would the US students visit a mosque in 
Indianapolis and speak with the Imam, but they would also meet with a local Rabbi. The deep 
and protracted conversations with Gaza then, would be at least partially informed by Jewish 
and Israeli perspectives.  
Of note is that Gaza University is a private institution catering to a somewhat 
privileged class. The students tend not to be the children of the refugee camps, many of 
whom eke out a living by working in the illegal underground smuggling tunnels from Gaza 
into Egypt, and survive in large part through UN food relief. The Gaza students that US 
students interacted with, and also developed close bonds of friendship, were young men and 
women who could more easily envision a future beyond the blockaded borders of what is 
frequently described by people like Noam Chomsky as the “world’s largest open air prison” 
(2012). The offer of summer scholarships to IUPUI for the top Gaza students to undertake 
focused research on our topic was certainly a strong inspiration to be a part of this learning 
experiment and to participate fully in what were often hard-hitting and controversial 
discussions.  
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A Meeting of Worlds 
The Spring 2012 collaboration involved sixteen IUPUI students and, via the medium 
of Skype, sixteen Gaza University students. For the Indiana students, the course was 
advertised as a “virtual study abroad” experience to the Gaza Strip. The US students each had 
a virtual host family in Gaza: they exchanged personal videos with their Gaza counterparts, 
and they had an opportunity to learn firsthand about Gaza lives and hopes for the future. 
From their new-found friends and in lectures they learned of the impact of Israel’s blockade 
of Gaza and the Hamas dictatorship. This unexpurgated glimpse into life in the densely 
populated 25-mile narrow strip of land revealed the hardship of power rationing, the high 
unemployment, the anarchic and controversial tunnel economy, and the nightly bombings and 
deadly retaliation. 
The US class was coupled with another in the IUPUI Department of Communication 
Studies on the topic of argumentation in which the students at IUPUI role-played the multiple 
perspectives of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, brainstorming various avenues for the 
resolution of the issues that appear intractable, namely borders, settlements, refugees and 
Jerusalem. This would be the main project topic for students in the US-Gaza peace incubator.  
Indiana students included the usual mix of those with very limited exposure to life 
outside of their home state, as well as refugees from Bosnia and Venezuela and immigrants 
from Nigeria and Syria. There were Blacks, Latinos, and Whites, as well as Republicans, 
Democrats, Libertarians and an Anarchist. There were eight male and eight female students.  
The multicultural US classroom was juxtaposed on a Gaza classroom with nowhere 
near the same level of diversity. Gaza is a conservative Muslim society and the majority of 
the students were female and veiled. They enjoyed few of the freedoms that the US students 
took for granted, including the freedom of speech and of movement. All were imbued with 
the spirit of Sumud by which is meant resilience and resistance, the inner cry for freedom, a 
philosophy symbolized in Palestinian minds by the ancient olive tree or the mother with child 
(Musleh, 2011). 
Our initial goal for the course was as provocative in Gaza as it was in Indiana. As an 
academic who is also a peace activist, McIntosh’s interest was in first overcoming the 
reluctance of his Gaza partners to work with Americans on projects exploring the pathways 
of peace in the Middle East. Levels of suspicion ran high, for the US and Israel are perceived 
in a similar light. To be accused of appeasement with Israel is a serious charge in Gaza, just a 
short step removed from an accusation of being a spy, which can lead to serious 
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consequences. Alfaleet was therefore under considerable pressure to prove to his 
administration that building the capacity of both US and Palestinian students to collaborate 
and begin the work of long-term peace building was in everyone’s best interests.  
Barriers, both physical and political, prevent meaningful contact between Palestinians 
in Gaza and Israelis. Knowledge of life on the other side of the separation barrier is all but 
non-existent. It is a most unfortunate scenario, typical of intractable conflict, where each side 
considers the other to be the embodiment of evil: Israel views Gaza’s Hamas government as a 
terrorist organization bent on the destruction of Israel; and all Gazans, whether or not they are 
affiliated with Hamas, are considered as legitimate targets and suffer therefore from a form of 
“collective punishment.” But then the official Hamas political stance is a refusal to 
acknowledge the right of Israel to exist.  
In the classroom setting, the Palestinian students openly debated the relative merits of 
Hamas rule and the circumstances of life in the Gaza strip; the lack of elections, endemic 
poverty, erratic service provision, pollution, and high reliance on foreign aid. In terms of 
Israel, however, the Gaza students spoke with one voice. Most were refugees or from refugee 
families from cities outside of the Gaza Strip and they wanted to visit their homes in Israel (to 
which many still possess keys) and their holy site in Al Quds (Jerusalem) – Haram al-Sharif. 
They wanted to see a one state solution where Jews and Palestinians lived side by side with 
the same rights and responsibilities, and an end to the Jewish character of the Israeli state.  
Our challenge was to provide Indiana students with an opportunity to hear from both 
sides of the separation wall and to reflect upon, and respond to, Palestinian perspectives on 
reconciliation not readily available or accessible elsewhere. For Gaza students, the goal was 
to impart the basics on processes of peace-building and reconciliation in a way that might 
inspire some consideration of the preconditions for moving forwards. But it was very hard to 
speak of peace and reconciliation, when, during March 2012, for example, Israeli bombs 
were raining down on Gaza for five straight days killing many innocent civilians and 
traumatizing not just the Gaza students, but also their new friends in Indianapolis. How 
would the students respond to a Gandhian “sermon” on non-violence? By the moving words 
of Martin Luther King on the arc of the moral universe being long but bending toward 
justice? By Desmond Tutu’s Ubuntu philosophy for instilling that sense of courage necessary 
for envisioning a better future and also pathways leading to that destination?  
With the very real possibility of an escalating conflict and a ground war, we began our 
lectures addressing the pressing issues that divide Arabs and Jews without specifically 
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mentioning the protracted conflict at all. We wanted the students to be thinking “outside the 
box” so we began with a discussion of Enlightenment ideals and the associated vision of 
social inclusion or plurality. We had already initiated a series of introductory lectures on the 
history of the Middle East by both IUPUI and Gaza University political scientists. But we 
wanted to provide a framework for considering international relations from an entirely 
different lens.  
Theoretical Framework 
Enlightenment thinking prioritized the interests of humanity over the interests of 
nations. Philosopher Immanuel Kant (1939), for example, envisioned a future federation of 
free states bound by laws of universal hospitality where a violation of rights in one part was 
felt everywhere. But, at the beginning of the 21st century, we asked the students, are we any 
closer to overcoming the narrow confines of national self-interest and achieving a universal 
cosmopolitan existence, as described by Appiah (2006), where members renounce patriotism 
and nationalism and defend universal values as opposed to national ones? We discussed 
whether there was an emerging global division between those states where the majority 
believed that their country should be either: 1. A home to all and that race, color, religion, 
and creed should be no bar to belonging; or 2. Home only to their own. The rallying cry of 
“one nation, one state” among various ethnic and religious groups strikes a note of terror for 
those non-majority or oppressed peoples seeking a sense of belonging, equality, and self-
worth in their adopted or native homeland.   
Globalization and Multiculturalism 
We then debated the ways in which globalization was reducing the economic 
sovereignty of nations and we emphasized how the clash of rival nationalisms within states 
was still the main cause of violence in the world today. It was once presumed (in 
Enlightenment thinking) that ethnicity would decline in the face of a shrinking planet, as 
people became increasingly interdependent in economic and cultural terms, and there was 
increased awareness that we are “one world” facing common ecological, political, and 
security problems. Yet the rapid dissolution of the known has led to the now well-
documented phenomenon, described by Thomas Friedman (2000) in The Lexus and the Olive 
Tree, of people clinging to the familiar and reaffirming and reifying what is believed to be 
true at the local level. In so doing they are re-energizing the primordial standard-bearers, 
namely, ethnicity, tribe, race, language, religion, and nation. Mortimer and Fine’s (2002) 
excellent volume People, Nation and State: The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism 
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informed much of the class conversation.  
David Napier (2003), in his book The Age of Immunology: Conceiving a Future in an 
Alienating World speaks to this alarming and divisive trend by reference to a metaphor; the 
immune system and its all-consuming drive to protect the self from the other. In the 
battlefield of the body, the role of the immune system is to distinguish between the self and 
the non-self and to subdue the latter. All things “other” are viewed not as a means of learning 
and growing stronger through a process of incorporation, but as a potential threat to the 
body’s integrity, well-being and future survival. Napier suggests that we are immunizing 
ourselves against the possibility of systemic change or adaptation in this new global dawning. 
When seen through this lens, the blending of peoples and the merging of civilizations that 
have given rise to the greatest breakthroughs of human history is an anachronism. The idea 
that Israelis and Palestinians were in the process of immunizing themselves against each 
other did not require amplifying.  
In a related narrative, Steven Pinker (2011), in his book, Better Angels of our Nature: 
Why Violence has Declined argues that human civilization has become steadily less violent 
over recent centuries and that the years since 1945 have been especially tranquil. But, as Ross 
Douthat (2011) argues, there has been a price for this advance. The most successful modern 
states have often gained stability at the expense of diversity, driving out or even murdering 
their minorities on the road to peaceful coexistence with their neighbors. Europe’s harmony, 
for example, was made possible only through decades of expulsions and genocide. Douthat 
(2011) quotes Jerry Z. Muller (2008) essay Us and them. The enduring power of ethnic 
nationalism, on how the two world wars rationalized the continent’s borders, replacing the 
old multiethnic empires with homogenous nation states and eliminating minority populations 
and polyglot regions. A decade of civil war and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia 
completed the process. In 1900 there were many states in Europe without a single 
overwhelmingly dominant nationality, but by 2007 there were only two, and one of those, 
Belgium, is close to breaking up. Consider also, for example, the fate of Coptic Christians in 
the new Egypt. Douthat suggests that if a European style age of democratic peace awaits the 
Middle East and Africa, it lies on the far side of ethnic and religious re-sortings and he asks 
whether it will it be worth the wars, genocides, and forced migrations that might make it 
possible.  
From an Enlightenment perspective (Kant 1939), the doctrine that each state should 
be composed of one homogenous nation is pernicious. No state is an undifferentiated 
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monolithic whole. Most modern societies are socially, culturally, sexually, religiously, and 
ethnically heterogeneous. But how do we promote multiculturalism in a globalizing world 
where some view this concept as inherently evil and a threat to their integrity? Consider in 
silence for example, the shooting rampage by Norwegian Anders Breivik who was concerned 
for the purity of Norwegian blood and the danger posed by immigrants, in particular Muslims 
(Borchgrevink, 2013).  
Our classroom conversation then turned to how the survival of “homogenous” states 
around the world depends on their relationship with the multicultural states, and their pockets 
of homogeneity. We see the threat of homogenization or “Balkanization” not just in the 
Middle East but on multiple fronts around the world, following the European pattern in the 
twentieth century. Confronting these new waves of ethnic and religious separation and the 
associated “cleansing” requires fresh and imaginative thinking regarding borders, citizenship 
and nationality and this theoretical perspective informed the students’ thinking with regards 
to their main assignments.  
The Peace Curriculum 
The course content included the full range of experiences expected in a normal study 
abroad program. There were films, lectures, and a range of readings supplied by both project 
leaders. An Iranian expert on Middle East history and politics, Dr. Manochehr Hosseinzadeh, 
provided additional context with his lectures. This coursework was complemented by 
presentations by a Rabbi, who was also a member of the Jewish NGO J-Street, to both the US 
and Gaza classes. In addition, a former Israeli military officer who is a self-proclaimed 
“dove”, and a professor of education at Hebrew University, Jerusalem, who specializes in the 
study of those few schools in Israel that foster coexistence and have a multilingual (Arabic 
and Hebrew) curriculum, also made presentations to the US classroom. A number of 
documentaries were shown to the students and, where possible, these were also shared in the 
Gaza classroom. With limited internet connection in Gaza and restricted access to some web 
sites, this was not always possible. These films included “Tears of Gaza” about the 
devastation caused by the Israeli attacks in 2008/9, and “Peace, propaganda and the promised 
land,” where the classes debated the biased or pro-Israeli reporting in US media, and the 
controversy generated by the film in places like Canada where it was condemned as being 
one-sided in favor of Palestinians.  
As our goal was to familiarize the US students with Palestinian life and culture, we 
provided an opportunity for them to meet with IUPUI-based Palestinian students, faculty, and 
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staff, and also Palestinians from the broader community. They visited a local mosque where 
there was a lively discussion with the Imam on the place of women in Moslem society. They 
also enjoyed Middle Eastern food on several occasions and learned some basic Arabic 
language.  
We assessed student learning in Gaza and the US through a journal of reflections on 
the weekly private communications that each student had with their partner through email, 
Skype and Facebook. The task of interviewing their partners to learn about their hopes and 
dreams was coupled with an exercise where each student made a short 6-8 minute video of 
their life. This was a surprisingly difficult and eye-opening exercise for us all. What do we 
include or exclude and why? There were certainly many preconceived ideas held by the US 
students about Gaza lives, and vice versa. One Gaza student, for example, spoke out in her 
video about her love of marathon running, of chocolate milk-shakes, and horse-riding along 
the beach, which all seemed totally at odds with the reality that we expected to hear about. 
But then we learned that in order to enjoy such privileges, both the horse and also the 
chocolate, needed to be smuggled 60 meters beneath the ground through the illegal tunnels 
from Egypt into Gaza.  
Apart from the individual pairing of students, we also placed them into groups of four 
US and four Gaza students in order to tackle the larger topic of the course which was to 
explore solutions to the four main points of division between Arabs and Jews namely 
settlements, borders, refugees and Jerusalem. Both project leaders were on hand each and 
every day to answer questions from the students as were the various visitors who had come to 
the class throughout the semester.  
Reconciliation Studies 
The starting point for discussion of the pathways to peace was the literature on 
reconciliation, most notably the foundation text “From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation” 
edited by Yaacov Bar-Suman-Tov (2003), and also the work of Cynthia Cohen (2005) on 
creative approaches to reconciliation. Cohen says, for example, that: 
Reconciliation refers to a set of processes designed to transform relationships of 
hatred and mistrust into relationships of trust and trustworthiness. Reconciliation 
reflects a shift in attention from blaming the other to taking responsibility for the 
attitudes and actions of one’s self and one’s own community. Former enemies 
must empathize with each other’s suffering, express remorse, grant forgiveness, 
and offer reparations. (p. 10) 
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The tasks or preconditions of reconciliation that Cohen (2005, pp.10-11) describes, 
are in broad agreement with those of Bar-Suman-Tov (2003), and include, but are not limited 
to:  
1. Appreciating each other’s humanity and respecting each other’s culture 
2. Telling and listening to each other’s stories, and developing more complex narratives 
and more nuanced understandings of identity 
3. Acknowledging harms, telling truths, and mourning losses 
4. Empathizing with each other’s suffering 
5. Acknowledging and redressing injustices 
6. Expressing remorse, repenting, apologizing, letting go of bitterness, forgiving 
7. Imagining and substantiating a new future, including agreements about how future 
conflicts will be engaged constructively  
All of these tasks, Cohen (2005) says, require  
… learning new skills and unlearning what was formerly believed to be true. In 
many instances, however, the very notion of trust has been destroyed. Ethnic 
violence and long-standing oppression can leave people and communities with 
insufficient capacity to undertake this work. And yet, this is the only way 
forward… (p. 11) 
As McIntosh (2013, 2014) details elsewhere, the quest for reconciliation has three 
broad dimensions, namely desire, personal capacity, and opportunity. In the Gaza Strip, 
opportunities for peace-building and reconciliation are extremely limited. The massive 
separation walls that are mined and lined with barbed-wire prevent any meaningful contact 
between Gazans and Israelis. In terms of personal capacity to do the work of peace, this has 
been seriously eroded on both sides by repeated attacks and counterattacks. A number of the 
Gaza students had PTSD and were very bitter and emotionally scarred. One showed a photo 
of a burning Israeli flag on her Facebook page. She exclaimed “Let them drink from our 
cup,” when a Hamas missile took off towards populated Israeli townships in retaliation for 
the killing of a Palestinian civilian. When asked by one of the US students if she was afraid 
of being injured in the repeated bombings raids she replied, “Sister. We are not afraid. The 
Israelis are nothing.” And yet even with this widespread level of mistrust and even hatred, 
many of the Gaza students opened up in their conversations with the US students, and 
expressed a strong desire to find a way to work out differences in some meaningful fashion 
and to end the conflict.  
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Gestures of Reconciliation 
How do we ensure the official recognition of all peoples in a manner that honors their 
traditions and secures their rights, and legitimizes and values their existence and 
membership? McIntosh’s work in the field of peace and reconciliation and in the 
development of a methodology called Reconciliation Process Analysis (RPA) complements 
that of Gene Sharp (2002) and his development of a vocabulary of non-violent resistance to 
dictatorship. He is engaged in building a similar vocabulary of reconciliation initiatives 
suitable to any specific setting. Apart from an examination and analysis of the full range of 
reconciliatory gestures for making amends for historical injustices, from trials and truth 
commissions, apologies and forgiveness, material and symbolic forms of reparation, and so 
on, he also explores strategies for building inclusive national identities, and he stressed this in 
his lectures with Gaza.  
In Israel and the West Bank we can witness many impressive grass roots peace and 
reconciliation initiatives designed by some of the most creative brains in the academic field 
of conflict resolution. Noted mediator William Ury, author of Getting To Yes (2011) and 
Getting Past No (1991), advocates for a pilgrimage through the Holy Land to build a sense of 
solidarity between the Abrahamic Peoples of the Book. Maestro Daniel Barenboim who 
started the Divan East-West Orchestra with Palestinian and Israeli musicians is another 
inspirational peacemaker. Then there is the mathematician who won Israel’s most coveted 
prize and donated the proceeds to Palestinian mathematicians and to an Israeli organization 
working for coexistence in the West Bank. Chefs for Peace, Combatants for Peace, the Israel 
Palestine Comedy Tour, Rabbis for Palestine, Anarchists against the Wall, and so on, are all 
making a contribution. But as Karen Brouneus (2003) reminds us, the total number of 
reconciliatory gestures in any given location is no measure for determining if reconciliation is 
actually being advanced. It can often mean the very opposite; that the society is moving away 
from peace. 
Small scale initiatives like the above can be harbingers of meaningful change but on 
the whole, the net result is usually minimal and the most that can expected is “first order 
change” which occurs within a system that remains unchanged. Focused programs like the 
Arab-Israeli Mt Everest Climb, or Football for Peace, do not, ultimately, speak truth to 
power, and they rarely empower the oppressed so that they can pursue their political interests 
more effectively. While based on the contact hypothesis that intergroup interaction can bring 
about attitudinal change which can result in a reduction of tension, the breakdown of 
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stereotypes, and the promotion of more harmonious relationships, group prejudices and 
taken-for granted images live on in the post-game, post-climb and post-pilgrimage period.  
How do we deliver second-order change where the system itself is transformed? How 
do we reach “tipping points”, those decisive moments when there is a significant movement 
or development of a positive sort in human relations? An example of such a tipping point is 
when South Africa’s Nelson Mandela chose a new national anthem for his country that 
incorporated the words and music of both Afrikaner and African songs, or when he made a 
new flag for the rainbow nation, or created the National Day of Reconciliation to coincide 
with the Afrikaner sacred Day of the Vow. Mandela also embraced the white-favored Rugby 
Union football over soccer and inspired South Africa to become World Cup Champions in 
the mid-1990s. His white bodyguard, whose story is reflected in the Hollywood movie 
Invictus, spoke of how Mandela’s wearing of the “Springbok” jersey did more for 
reconciliation than any other single gesture in the whole post-Apartheid period.  
For Mandela, civic rather than ethnic nationalism was in focus; that is, promoting a 
form of nationalism that appeals on the basis of shared allegiance to certain constitutional 
principles (Habermas’s constitutional patriotism) and not on the basis of ethnicity, language, 
religion, or race. Michael Ignatieff (1999) has also argued for the grounding of national 
symbols and traditions in civic values with which all can easily identify—like France’s 
“liberty, equality, and fraternity”—symbols and traditions that will unite citizens in patriotic 
attachment to a shared set of values that celebrate plurality and difference, and not the old 
standard bearers. This was Mandela’s challenge, and it is a challenge that Israelis and 
Palestinians now face.  
Rabbi Michael Lerner (2012) in Embracing Israel/Palestine: A Strategy to Heal and 
Transform the Middle East examines how the mutual demonization and discounting of each 
sides’ legitimate needs drive the antagonism, and he explores the underlying psychological 
dynamics that fuel the intransigence. He describes the importance of being both pro-Israel 
and pro-Palestine and argues that long term peace and security is best achieved through an 
ethos of caring and generosity toward the other. In accord with Bar-Suman-Tov (2003) and 
Cohen (2005) he calls for a psychological change in the way that we approach the conflict, 
believing that we must first work at becoming friends. But as Andrew Rigby (2001) argues, 
for any of peace and reconciliation initiatives to be successful there must be equal status and 
common goals in and out of the encounter, and participants need the endorsement and 
support of opinion leaders. Such gestures, in other words, need to take place within the 
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context of a society that wants them to succeed. Is this the case for Israel and Palestine? 
Student Reports 
US and Gaza students presented their final reports jointly via Skype to an audience 
that included professors and administrators from both universities and community members. 
In this “public” setting, the Gaza students were somewhat restricted in what they were 
prepared to say but, as none of the topics focused directly on Gaza, but rather on Palestinians 
in general, they were forthright in their presentations.  
In one essay, US and Gaza students made reference to a very powerful article by 
noted Jewish blogger Robert Cohen (2012) entitled Occupy the Haggadah-Radical Thoughts 
for Passover. Cohen quotes from the scriptures:  
Wandering in the desert, without our own land or borders, we recorded the 
commandments that were meant to shape us as a people. “You shall not oppress a 
stranger, for you know the feelings of the stranger, having yourselves been 
strangers in the land of Egypt.” (Exodus 23:9)… “The stranger who resides with 
you, shall be to you as one of your citizens; you shall love him as yourself, for you 
were strangers in the land of Egypt.” (Leviticus 19:34)  
Robert Cohen’s plans for his own family Passover celebration were quoted by the 
students:  
This year when my family sits down for the annual retelling of the Exodus story, 
there will be some new additions to the evening’s order of service. We will 
include prayers for justice, thought-provoking reflections on the meaning of the 
Holocaust from Jews and Palestinians, and acknowledgment of our own 
complicity in taking freedom from others. We will dip into salt water three times 
to remember not only our tears but the tears of our neighbors too. And alongside 
the salt water, Elijah’s wine glass and Miriam’s cup, we will make an addition to 
the Seder plate. Next to the bitter herbs, the horoset, the motzah, the shankbone, 
we will add some Palestinian olive oil to remember that the land has meaning to 
another people too. And when we break the motzah, we will do so as a symbol of 
sharing the land. And to soften our brittle “bread of oppression” we will pour on 
some of the Palestinian olive oil. 
At least one Gaza student was moved to tears by the sentiments expressed here. She 
had never encountered such language from a Jew, and was quite overwhelmed. She saw this 
article as having the potential of helping pave the way for reconciliation between Arabs and 
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Jews.   
This same group of students, when considering creative solutions for the future of 
Jewish settlements in the West Bank, then reported on the need for laying the foundation for 
reconciliation. They suggested the creation of “reconciliation establishments”, actual physical 
structures that could be used to help foster good relationships between Israelis and 
Palestinians on the ground. They saw a need for: 
 Economic Centers: The Jewish settlements in the West Bank could potentially serve 
as centers of economic integration, and facilitate cooperation, while fueling political 
reconciliation.   
 Educational Centers: The settlements could serve as centers of education in a new 
Israeli-Palestinian state, in which Arabs and Israelis would come together to build 
multi-cultural schools.  
 Sports Arenas: The settlements could also house sports arenas in which Palestinians 
and Israelis would enjoy soccer and other games together and begin to develop 
teamwork skills that would allow them to forget about the tensions between their 
parents and government representatives, and serve as springboards for reconciliation.   
 Shopping Malls/Amusement Parks: Israelis and Palestinians would enjoy shopping 
and hanging out with friends, temporarily forgetting their problems, prejudices and 
fears.  
Reflecting back on the preconditions for reconciliation expressed by Cynthia Cohen 
(2005), the students understood that their proposed solutions would require a significant shift 
in the current political and social atmosphere in Israeli and Palestinian territories. By 
embracing these tasks and principles and by putting in place actual physical structures in the 
settlements dedicated to the promotion of peace, the pathway can be laid and the journey to 
reconciliation initiated, they said.  
Teachable Moments 
It is important to mention that this class was not free of controversy. From the US 
side, the subject of the Gaza class caused an immediate flurry of interest and suspicion on the 
part of Indianapolis Jewish community organizations. As one Jewish colleague and friend at 
IUPUI was quick to point out, our subject matter was the “third rail” of US politics; 
dangerous both personally and professionally.  
The fireworks came early in the semester when we decided to host an Arab-Israeli 
dialog in the broader Indianapolis community in order to model for students the sort of 
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discussion that we would like to see on the global stage. A local NGO, the Center for 
Interfaith Cooperation, arranged for two Israelis and two Palestinians, now US citizens, to 
speak on the pathways to peace and they all enthusiastically agreed. However two days 
before the event the Israelis demanded one hour alone with the US students as a precondition 
for their involvement. They assumed that the students were all biased in favor of Palestine. A 
series of conversations through an intermediary identified their stance as being triggered by 
the proposed date of the event, which coincided with a global “Anti-apartheid Israel” protest 
and rally in support of the BDS movement (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israeli 
settlements and industry in the West Bank). They believed the session was timed to 
embarrass them but this was not the case. The dialog was cancelled. Finally, we agreed on a 
three part process which would culminate in the Israelis and Palestinians being invited to a 
general celebration of Middle Eastern culture where we would watch a film on reconciliation 
but with no open discussion on the peace process. Some Jews came to this final session, but 
no Palestinians.  
There would be more fireworks later, and more teachable moments after the class had 
ended, when IUPUI invited the top two Gaza students, both young women, to spend two 
months over the Summer in 2012 working on their research topics. One focused her studies 
on domestic violence and women’s empowerment in the Gaza Strip, and the other on the 
potential role of social media for social change in Gaza. The planned public event was 
entitled Film, Food and the Future. The two students would share their research and we 
would show some of the films that Gaza faculty had made as part of the class, including one 
on the controversial Gaza Tunnel economy, where not only food and building products arrive 
into Gaza, but also missiles, drugs and other contraband.  
The reaction of some members of the local Jewish community to an event flyer was 
swift, as the advertising was perceived to be misrepresenting the tunnels primary function, 
which they deemed to be military-based. From some Indiana University Alumni including 
from as far away as Fort Wayne, Indiana came an ultimatum: The event should be cancelled, 
or, if it proceeded then 1. the Gaza students should not be permitted to speak about the future 
of Gaza; 2. the film of the tunnels should not be aired and; 3. Jewish spokespeople should be 
present on stage to refute the Hamas propaganda of the students. These individuals indicated 
that the penalty for not addressing these demands would be the withdrawal of continued 
generous support to the Alumni Association. McIntosh cancelled the event against the wishes 
of both the US and the Gaza students because he did not want to expose the students to an 
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ugly encounter with seasoned lobbyists, especially given that their summer experience at 
IUPUI had been so positive and life-changing.  
A legal request under the freedom of information act from a California individual to 
IUPUI came soon thereafter, requesting all correspondence connected with the cancelled 
Gaza event, the memos, emails, flyers and so on. This action, we gathered, was designed to 
intimidate us and dissuade us from proceeding with anything similar in the future. The 
university lawyer forwarded a package of over 1500 pages of emails to the Californian for we 
had nothing to hide. This was a class designed to promote peace-building and the search for 
solutions to problems in the Middle East which are often described as insoluble.  
Conclusion: Embracing a Vision of Change 
To host a successful program, the onus is on the project leaders to create a learning 
environment where there is a willingness by students to step outside of their comfort zones 
and to interact with and learn from people from quite different cultures and ways of life. 
Some students, both in the US and Gaza, reported that this was their favourite class in their 
student careers. Others, while remaining staunch in their support of one side or the other, 
appreciated the opportunity to see beyond received stereotypes. We can expect no more of a 
study abroad experience. 
The intercultural component allowed IUPUI students to see their own culture in 
perspective, and to appreciate the diversity of human experience. The reviews emphasized the 
need for the students to be open-minded, to reconsider previously held beliefs and to adjust 
their thinking based on newly received information. The students also understood the 
necessity of being able to operate civilly in a complex world, and to recognize the 
connectedness of local and global communities.  
US students came to value their freedom of speech and of politics, something that 
they often take for granted. They greatly appreciated their access to social services, 
electricity, water, to equality and also respect for diversity and pluralism. They also 
appreciated the opportunity to develop long-term friendships with a people often derided as 
“the enemy” in our media. These friendships have extended beyond the classroom.  
From the Gaza perspective, student reviews showed that the opportunity to connect to 
the outside world has provided an avenue of hope. The wall had been breached, if only 
virtually. This was a strategy of liberation championed by the late Jewish-Palestinian peace 
activist Juliano Mer Khamis of the West Bank village of Jenin. The instigator of the 
“Freedom Theater”, Juliano spoke of a coming Third Intifada or Palestinian uprising that 
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would be mounted through art, music, poetry and film to empower actors and audiences to 
transcend the walls that imprison them. Through drama therapy or art therapy, for example, 
Palestinian youth would have a chance to deal creatively with their torment and tormentors. 
They would develop the capacity, currently lacking, to do the work of long-term peace 
building and not resort to violence. Words would become their Molotov cocktails, one of 
Juliano’s students exclaims in the sad and yet ultimately inspiring film “Arna’s Children” 
(Mer Khamis & Danniel, 2004). For Gaza students, it was this glimmer of hope that was most 
pronounced  
In the science of visioning, as conceived by peace scholar Elise Boulding (1990), 
students will anchor their dreams for the future in intensely real images, compelling action in 
the present to fulfill them. Designing a plan of action to realize the dream and inspiring 
participants to believe in their vision, was our goal. With our class, then, we hoped to 
contribute in some small fashion to this grand “third intifada” for reconciliation as this was 
understood by the Gaza students as being a necessary first step forwards. The late 
Christopher Reeves (1996) once remarked, “So many of our dreams at first seem impossible, 
then they seem improbable, and then, when we summon the will, they soon become 
inevitable.” It is with this spirit that we embarked upon our experiment in peace education by 
transforming our classrooms into a peace incubator. There were many challenges, and also 
many lessons and rewards. The most noteworthy was a chance to see a vision of the future 
emerge from our incubator that was quite different to that constrained and defined by the 
politics of walls, rockets, drones, tunnels and warships, and the futility of endless retaliation 
and revenge.  
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The Political Economy of Ivory as a “Conflict Resource” 
Natasha White 
 
Abstract  
The past year has seen attention directed, both in policy discourse and the media, towards the 
implication of Central African non-state armed groups in poaching and ivory trafficking. 
Engaging with both mainstream political economy analyses and work on the “geographies of 
resource wars,” this paper turns to the case of ivory as a “conflict resource,” through the case 
study of the Lord’s Resistance Army. It begins by outlining the contextual specificities and 
conditions of access, before assessing the compatibility of the resource’s biophysical, spatial 
and material characteristics with the needs of regional armed groups and the LRA in 
particular. Though the direction of causality is difficult to untangle, the paper finds that 
poaching and the trade in ivory by armed groups in Central Africa appears to incur low 
opportunity costs for relatively high potential gains. Moreover, that ivory qualifies as a 
“conflict resource” under Le Billon’s (2008) definition in the extent to which it is likely to be 
implicated in the duration of conflict in the region, both financing and benefitting from a 
context of insecurity. Future research would benefit from more accessible and robust data; 
interesting avenues would include an evaluation of the effects of the increasing militarization 
of poaching strategies - including shoot-to-kill policies - and the potential of igniting 
grievance-based conflict.  
 
The Political Economy of Ivory as a “Conflict Resource” 
In December 2012, the United Nations (UN) Security Council called for a joint 
investigation with the African Union into the alleged involvement of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) in elephant poaching and the illicit trade of ivory. This both reflected the 
revelations of an array of media investigations and non-governmental organisations’ (NGOs) 
reports, and triggered increasing scrutiny of the issue from security institutions, such as the 
United States’ State Department and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa. 
Ivory – once symbolic of colonial trophies, adventure and ‘Wild Africa’ – has become a 
component of the “strategic narratives” of national security bodies, both in Africa and abroad.  
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The ivory trade and plight of Africa’s elephants have long been the concern of a range 
of conservation and environmental NGOs, activists and scientists, as well as government 
bodies anxious to protect an important source of tourism income. Indeed, 2013 is the
 
fortieth 
anniversary of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES), the international treaty that was responsible for the ban in international 
ivory trade in 1989. However, it has only been over the last couple of years that public 
reports have begun linking the resource with Central African armed groups. Popularized in 
the media as “blood ivory,” tusks have been compared to other conflict resources, including 
diamonds. Tom Cardamone, Managing Director of Global Financial Integrity, has estimated 
the global value of illicit wildlife trade in general to be between US$7.8 and US$10 billion, 
and states that ivory, in particular, can “rival cocaine and gold in value by weight” 
(Cardamone, 2012, p. 2). References abound not only to regional militia groups, including the 
Janjaweed, LRA and al-Shabab (Gossmann, 2010; Somerville, 2013; UN, 2013), but also to a 
transnational organised crime (TNOC) network (Scanlon, 2012). Nonetheless, academic 
research on the political economy of ivory as a ‘conflict resource’ remains thin on the ground.  
This paper attempts to begin to address this gap in a body of literature that has 
predominantly focussed on diamonds, oil, timber and narcotics (Fearon, 2004; Le Billon, 
2008; Nordstrom, 2004; Ross, 2003, 2006). Engaging with both mainstream political 
economy analyses and “geographies of resource wars,” it will attempt to employ a nuanced 
approach with the goal of evaluating recent claims on ivory as a conflict resource, a part from 
essentialist conservation and media discourses. Through an analysis of the resource’s 
specificity, spatiality and trans-border dynamics, it will aim to move away from state-centric 
approaches and focus on the micro-dimensions of the regional conflict. 
I will begin by briefly reviewing existing literature on natural resources and conflict, 
before outlining the analytical framework that will be employed. Section three will turn to the 
specific case of ivory as a conflict resource, analysing the contextual specificities and 
conditions of access, as well as the resource’s biophysical, spatial and material 
characteristics. Section four will provide a series of concluding remarks. 
Two groups in particular have been reportedly implicated in elephant poaching in 
Central Africa – the LRA and the Darfurian militia group, the Janjaweed (UN, 2013); this 
paper will focus predominantly on the former, however, due to the relative availability of 
information on their whereabouts and activities. Moreover, its focus is on regional, not intra- 
or inter-state conflict. This is due both to the lack of country-specific data, and the mobile 
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nature of the armed groups implicated and the trans-border conflict dynamics. It will draw on 
media accounts, policy reports and data, obtained online and via email communications with 
a range of policy professionals. However, it is nonetheless limited by the minimal and 
anecdotal nature of evidence at the time of writing, and lack of robust data on both the illicit 
ivory trade and transnational (criminal) networks in Central Africa. 
Background Literature on Natural Resources and Armed Conflict 
Over the past decade or so, scholarly debate on the relationship between natural 
resources and conflict onset has been largely polarised in the greed versus grievance debate 
(Berdal & Malone, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2004). Broad consensus has settled, 
however, on a three-factor model of the occurrence of rebellion, largely inspired by Gurr 
(1970) – motivation, opportunity and identity (Arnson & Zartman, 2006; Ellingsen, 2000; Le 
Billon, 2012; Lujala, Gleditsch, & Gilmore, 2005). Rebels need a motive (e.g. economically-
motivated greed or politically-motivated grievances); the possibility to achieve their goal; and 
a common identity for group formation (Lujala et al., 2005). Predation models have examined 
the extraction and taxation basis of insurgency; a relationship based around a deal balancing 
rent extraction versus protection (Snyder, 2006). Some have also employed Mancur Olson’s 
(1993) differentiation of “roving” and “stationary” bandits, an early model of the spatiality of 
rule, to understand the balance between extraction and protection (Beardsley, Gleditsch, & 
Lo, 2013; Thies, 2010; Weinstein, 2007). Natural resources are relevant to all of the above 
factors (Korf, 2011). However, for the purpose of this paper, I will focus on the opportunity 
and feasibility aspects.  
Fearon and Laitin (2003), for example, look at factors that make insurgency feasible 
and attractive, but found that financing and opportunity to loot are not the only influential 
factors. Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore (2005, p. 540) also show how “the looting of natural 
resources (or extortion in connection with extraction activities) provides economic activity 
for rebel movements”. These authors build on Collier and Hoeffler’s (1998) proposition that 
the opportunity to loot or exploit resources was instrumental in the onset of violent conflict 
and have stimulated a body of literature on conflict resources. This literature shows how, 
“with the end of the Cold War, more belligerents have come to rely on revenues from 
commodities such as timber, oil, narcotics or precious minerals” (Le Billon, 2008, p. 345). 
Precious gems, for example, are portrayed as the primary motive in the onset of warlord-led, 
greed-driven conflicts (Campbell, 2002; Le Billon, 2006; Lujala et al., 2005).  
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However, less research has focussed on resource endowments and conflict duration 
with reference to the micro-foundations of conflict, rather than large-N (cross-country) 
statistical analysis (Korf, 2011; Lujala et al., 2005). This is of relevance to this paper, as I will 
not argue that ivory has been an underlying cause in the onset of conflict and violence in 
Central Africa. Instead, I suggest that through providing a source of finance for armed 
groups, such as the LRA, ivory is one factor (amongst others, including group organisation, 
military tactics, international response etc.) in its duration. An early proponent of this 
argument was Keen (1998), who argued that increased access to and trade in resources within 
war economies makes ending civil wars difficult.  Later, Fearon (2004) has shown that 
conflicts with rebel groups that have access to contraband goods tend to last longer than other 
conflicts, as they provide a dependable source of finance. Others have focussed on diamonds 
and oil (Humphreys, 2005; Lujala et al., 2005; Ross, 2004), but there is little consensus on 
whether they prolong or shorten civil wars. 
Overall, resources, as the unit of analysis, have come to be understood in terms of 
financing hostilities, as well as shaping motives of violence, the behaviour of armed groups 
and the duration of conflict, not just its onset (Wennmann, 2008). More recently, research has 
reengaged with the post-Cold War geographical dimensions of conflict, paying greater 
attention to specific resource characteristics, including distribution and concentration, rather 
than focusing solely on political boundaries as the defining feature (Klare, 2001; Korf, 2011; 
Le Billon, 2001, 2008). Auty (2001) and Mac Ginty (2004) demonstrate how some resources 
are more accessible, or “lootable,” to rebels than others, offering them the ability to scale-up 
and profit from hostilities. According to Auty (2001), geographically concentrated (“point”) 
resources and geographically spread (“diffuse”) resources will lead to different conflict 
dynamics. Le Billon (2004, p. 15) expands on the above, adding a second geographical 
criterion – the location of the resource site from the centre of state power. Cross-tabulating 
these, he presents a typology of conflicts associated with different “resource spatialities” (p. 
16). Finally, Ross (2003) includes the dimension “obstructability” (value-to-weight ratio and 
ease of transportation). Research findings in general argue in favour of a relationship between 
conflict and lootable resources, such as alluvial diamonds and narcotics (Lujala et al, 2005; 
Olsson, 2006; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005). This literature has made an important contribution 
in clarifying some of the rather broad claims in Collier’s original propositions (Ron, 2005). 
The paper will proceed to evaluate the evidence for ivory as a conflict resource, 
according to Le Billon’s (2008) definition encompassing: “the control, exploitation, trade, 
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taxation or protection of natural resources, which contributes to, or benefits from, the context 
of armed conflict” (p. 349). With reference to Le Billon’s analytical framework (2008, p. 
348), the next section will explore the compatibility of the resource’s biophysical, spatial and 
material characteristics with the needs of regional armed groups and the LRA in particular. 
However, first it will turn to contextual specificities and conditions of resource access.  
Ivory and Conflict in Central Africa 
Context and Vulnerability 
Central Africa has a long history of political violence and brutality, the causes of 
which are complex and deep-rooted. Political and economic marginalization, weak 
institutions, an abundance of natural resources, a climate conducive to the spread of tropical 
diseases, the ubiquity of small arms and uncontrollable borders are factors in the persistence 
of conflict and insecurity to this day (Flint, 2009; ICG, 2010; Taylor, 2003). While each 
country has experienced conflict in its own right, together the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and South Sudan compose a 
patchwork of regional instability (ICG, 2010), or a “regional conflict complex” (Pugh & 
Cooper, 2004, p. 2). These are typically characterised by the “cross-border spillover of 
violence and borderlands as sanctuaries for combatants, nurseries for recruits and centres for 
shadow economic activities” (Pugh & Cooper, 2004, p. 2) and, according to Taylor (2003), 
are characteristic of the globalisation of Africa’s conflicts and their progressive insertion into 
the international political economy. Interregional connections make for prolonged and 
intractable conflicts, involving actors as diverse as TNOCs, private military companies and 
multinational companies (Pugh & Cooper, 2004).  
Latham, Kassimir, and Callaghy (2001) argue that the regional and transnational 
forces that traverse Central Africa are important factors to help make sense of the region’s 
conflicts today. These networks exist in a causal relationship with conflict. On the one hand, 
they are a facilitated by the “region-wide state of disorder and the modus operandi this offers 
a variety of actors operating within areas where the formal state is in process of eclipse” 
(Taylor, 2003, p. 51). On the other hand, these regional networks have facilitated the 
emergence of “spaces of opportunity” (Le Billon, 2008, p. 361) in what is essentially “a 
kleptocratic political economy” (Taylor, 2003, p. 45). They offer the conditions of access to 
markets that bring together a constellation of predatory actors, each seeking to exploit and 
extract rents from Central Africa’s resources and/or construct chains of influence and control 
in the region (Le Billon, 2008). These spatial interconnections between actors at local, 
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regional and transnational scales enable the circulation of commodities and increase the 
“exploitability” of the resource (Silberberg & Ellis, 2007). In the case of ivory, TNOCs and 
“shadow networks – “a combination of political, economic and sociocultural forces linked to 
the international sphere and transactional in nature” (Nordstrom, 2004, p. 218) – have come 
to support armed militia by easing the conversion of ivory into cash and weapons. In 
conjunction with the increasing Chinese investment and human presence on the continent 
(CITES, 2013), they have served to decrease the distance between spaces of supply and 
demand, increasing price elasticity and providing poachers – including armed groups – with a 
reliable source of revenue in exchange for their prizes. 
Resource Characteristics and Opportunity 
Access to and control over natural resources are highly dependent on the mode of 
exploitation facilitated by this system of regional and transnational networks (Le Billon, 
2008; Titeca, 2011). But these “spaces of opportunity” also reflect the material specificities 
of the resource in question, including its biophysical and spatial characteristics (Le Billon, 
2008). Before exploring these elements, this section will examine the territoriality of one 
particular armed group – the LRA – and elephant range sites.  
The LRA is a non-state armed group originating in northern Ugandan and led by the 
warlord, Joseph Kony. From 1987 to 2007, the group reportedly abducted around 90,000 
children and killed up to 100,000 Ugandan citizens alone, committing indiscriminate violence 
over civilian populations (“Key Statistics,” 2013). Once supported by Sudan, the group’s 
financing lines and source of weapons have since been dissipating, particularly given the 
renewed offensive of the Ugandan army and support from the United States (US) (Titeca, 
2013). This has had implications for its mobility – the group is now reported to be in 
northeast DRC and southern CAR (HSBA, 2013; LRA Crisis Tracker, 2013) – as well as its 
tactics and motivation to poach (Bevan, 2004; Titeca, 2013). The group is extremely 
efficient, has few material incentives and requires only enough for subsistence and its 
operations. Two other important dimensions to note are: a) its reliance on small arms in 
contrast to larger weapons (due to forced mobility); and b) its extreme adaptability (Bevan, 
2004; HSBA, 2013).  
Territorialization of the LRA and poaching sites. 
A brief look at the recent territoriality of LRA activities shows correlation with 
elephant range sites and, most strikingly, sites of reported carcasses (CITES, 2011) in 
northeast DRC and southern CAR, particularly in Garamba and Okapi National Parks. A 
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series of sources have backed-up the LRA Crisis Tracker system, confirming the group’s 
presence (Gossmann, 2010; HSBA, 2013; United Nations, 2013). Attacks have been 
launched on ranger facilities, burning equipment and infrastructure, children have been 
abducted and at least eleven Congolese rangers have been killed since 2008 (Gettleman, 
2012). Park rangers from Garamba, tradesmen in Omburman, Sudan and former abductees 
have also all testified the LRA’s direct involvement in the ivory trade. Meanwhile, elephant 
numbers in the region declined by more than half between 1995 and 2011 (Beyers et al., 
2011). 
A geography of risk. 
An environment of conflict and insecurity has provided a safe haven for the group, 
facilitated its access to elephant populations and the ease with which it can convert the 
resource into cash or exchange it for weapons via illicit networks. Weak spatial control and 
ease of access decrease the transaction costs and make for an attractive cost-benefit ratio – 
regional vulnerability that Le Billon (2008, p. 349) terms a “geography of risk”. Moreover, 
the dangers associated with hunting elephants – risk of injury, the possibility of confrontation 
with other armed groups, and the likelihood of encountering enforcement action by the 
authorities – are likely to be child’s play for combatants that have been engaged in the LRA’s 
reign of terror for any substantial period of time. While the implementation of shoot-to-kill 
policies in some countries and the recent drive on increasing ranger capacity via training local 
units or despatching private security companies means they incur an increasingly large risk, 
combatants are relatively desensitised to the potential of such violence – particularly those 
from the LRA, where they undergo rituals specifically for this purpose (Allen & Vlassenroot, 
2010). The associated threat, therefore, is substantially lower.  
The above factors combine to provide for a relatively low opportunity cost and 
favorable risk-reward calculation. At this point it is unclear, however, whether these events 
represent “opportunistic looting”, or whether ivory is being strategically sought after to 
finance the groups’ operations as it adapts its survival strategies (HSBA, 2013). In order to 
evaluate the theoretical potential of ivory as a “conflict resource” – as actively financing 
hostilities – the next section will turn to the specific characteristics of the resource itself. 
Resource type. 
According to resource economics, ivory would be classified as an exhaustible, 
renewable resource (Silberberg & Ellis, 2007) – it is conditionally renewable, but its 
harvesting involves an inter-temporal trade off. Unless elephants are poached to extinction, 
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the resource will renew via reproduction; however, the time lag is large due to the years it 
takes for a young elephant to grow mature tusks. Poachers would thus be expected to have a 
positive time preference, exploiting the resource today to maximize immediate profit. 
Exploitation incentives and resource access are also influenced by ivory’s spatial and 
biophysical characteristics. According to the literature on the geographies of resource wars, 
ivory would be characterised as a “diffuse” resource (Auty, 2001; Le Billon, 2008). While 
elephant populations are concentrated at a global scale, originating from Sub-Saharan Africa 
and East Asia, at a regional level, they are relatively dispersed in comparison to “point” 
resources, such as minerals and oil.  Moreover, unlike oil, diamonds and minerals, the source 
of ivory – elephants – is also mobile (on average a herd will cover up to 80km per day 
(Bercovitch, 2008), geographically distant from the centre of power and, in the case of 
Central African elephants, a forest dweller (CITES, 2013). As geographically dispersed, 
mobile, forest dwellers that do not respect the boundaries of nation states, elephants are 
difficult to manage and control (Auty, 2001). Yet their spatial habits, such as moving to 
enclaves to wash and drink, mean they are temporarily and habitually concentrated and hence 
a relatively easy and low risk target for the informed poacher.  
Finally, ivory can be classified as a moderately “unobstructable resource” (Ross, 
2003, p. 62). Although Central African ivory comes from a landlocked, remote location and 
must be transported overland before it is flown or shipped to Asia, it has a moderate value-to-
weight ratio in comparison to diamonds and gemstones (high), and timber (low) (Ross, 2003), 
for example, and is relatively easy to transport. In 2012, an average tusk of 13.6kg would go 
for around US$32,000 on the international market (Saunders, 2012). Unlike oil, which 
requires significant investment and a vast infrastructure to extract, refine and trade (Ross, 
2003), the extraction of ivory is neither capital- nor labour- intensive and can be obtained 
with a few shots from a small arm, such as an AK47 (CITES, 2013). Furthermore, unlike 
point resources, such as oil or deep-shaft minerals which “often depend on international 
political recognition for mobilizing investors and access to markets” (Ross, 2003, p. 63), as 
discussed in the previous section, ivory can be easily converted into cash and weapons in the 
largely unregulated domestic markets across Central Africa (Apobo, 2004; Milliken, 2004; 
Ross, 2003). In sum, it is a resource that is not only easy to extract, but also relatively easy to 
transport and trade.  
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Materiality: Relative financial value.  
Ivory makes up a small proportion of the illicit trade in a range of commodities 
(Haken, 2011). If we compare ivory to rough diamonds and gemstones – other commonly 
conceptualised conflict resources – its monetary value in terms of global illicit trade is also 
relatively low (US$180 million and US$660 million, respectively) (Haken, 2011). However, 
although there is a substantial difference in the value of global trade, the ICG (2010) 
highlights how earnings from diamonds in the local context (in CAR) are “limited” – miners 
may expect on average US$160 for a one-carat diamond – “primarily because [they] are 
mostly ignorant of a diamond’s real value” (ICG, 2010, p. 9). In comparison, one kilogram of 
ivory is sold for at least US$15-35 in local markets (Apobo, 2004). More recent estimates 
(Gossmann, 2010) state that ivory is worth around US$100-150 per kilogram. This is a 
questionable price difference; nonetheless, according to the 2004 estimates, one tusk could 
fetch between US$200 and US$480, depending on its weight – substantially more than a one-
carat rough diamond.  
In relative terms, it appears that ivory is a lucrative resource for armed groups. In 
Mambasa, eastern DRC where ivory is sold for around US$15-20 per kilogram (both onto 
international criminal markets and to local traders and artists), an AK47 can be purchased for 
US$80-100 and ammunition for US$0.30-0.35 per cartridge (Apobo, 2004). So, for every 4-7 
kilograms of ivory sold – less than the weight of an average tusk – one weapon can be 
purchased and/or a substantial amount of ammunition. Between 2000 and 2004, 23,687 
kilograms of ivory was retrieved from the Okapi reserve in eastern DRC alone (Apobo, 
2004), equating to around US$414,500 on the domestic market, or 4,606 AK-47s. 
On the international market, the price of ivory has grown significantly over the past 
decade and in East Asia, for example, its value has almost tripled since 2001 (Gossmann, 
2010). Demand has been stimulated by increasing purchasing power in Asia where ivory is 
sought after by a burgeoning middle class for its beauty, religious symbolism and alleged 
medicinal properties (Martin & Vigne, 2011). Top-end price estimates from 2008-2010 
averaged around US$900 per kilogram in China and up to US$1,800 per kilogram in Vietnam 
(Begley 2008; Gossmann, 2010; Martin & Vigne, 2011). More recently, one kilogram has 
been reported to fetch around US$2,300 in Beijing (Gettleman, 2012; Saunders, 2012), 
showing significant price inflation. This indicates that today, in absolute terms, assuming one 
tusk of a mature bull elephant weighs on average 13.6 kilograms, a single dead elephant bull 
could provide up to US$62,560 of ivory in the end market. Moreover, the 23,687 kilograms 
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of ivory that could purchase 4,606 AK-47s in Okapi Reserve, eastern DRC would be worth 
around US$54.5m in East Asia. This difference in market price (disregarding transaction 
costs) suggests that couriers and middlemen are making substantial profits. 
Finally, prior research has highlighted how revenues from a single resource, though 
playing a major role in financing belligerents, are rarely the sole source of income (Le Billon, 
2008; Weinstein, 2007). Rather, these groups have multiple sources of financing and shift 
from one to another as a function of their needs (Wennmann, 2007). As such, the connections 
opened-up to illicit trading networks through the conversion of the ivory resource into cash 
are likely to increase the “predictability of economic interactions” (Titeca, 2011, p. 45) and 
hence the opportunities for trading other illegal goods as and when this becomes an option 
(Taylor, 2003), acting as a results multiplier. 
To conclude, in comparison to other conflict resources such as diamonds and timber, 
the relative value of global illicit trade in ivory is low. However, at regional and local levels, 
its relative value suggests it would be an attractive resource for armed groups, such as the 
LRA, who have little-to-no external funding sources, operate very efficiently and are 
extremely mobile. Moreover, as highlighted earlier in the paper, the value of a resource is not 
simply a function of its price, but also the ease of access, the risk associated with its 
extraction and the ease of conversion into cash and weapons (Le Billon, 2008). 
Conclusion 
The characteristics of the ivory economy outlined in this paper support both the case 
presented in verbal and media testimonies, and Le Billon’s (2008, p. 349) definition of a 
conflict resource, in the extent to which ivory is one likely source of revenue among others 
(via extraction and trade), both financing and benefitting from the context of armed conflict. 
As is implicit within this definition, it is difficult to untangle the direction of causality in the 
relationship between ivory and conflict; a difficulty compounded by the lack of robust 
empirical research and data on the subject at the time of writing. Nonetheless, this paper has 
attempted to unpack the relationship, drawing comparisons with other conflict resources. It 
has found that poaching and trade in ivory by armed groups in Central Africa appears to incur 
low opportunity costs for relatively high potential gains. Booming East Asian demand and 
ivory’s characteristic as an exhaustible resource provide market incentives to trade, while its 
spatial and biophysical resource characteristics, embedded in a context of insecurity, weak 
regulatory institutions and a dense system of illicit networks, provide ease of access and 
conversion into cash and weapons. Moreover, the low opportunity costs associated with its 
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extraction and trade are supported by the benefits provided by the likely linkages opened-up 
with TNOCs and well-connected local tradesmen.  
Finally, various sources have pointed to the implication of other actors. Increasing 
human-elephant conflict, for example, has been levied as a counter-argument, implementing 
locals in defence of their crops and livelihoods (CITES, 2013; Litoroh, Omondi, Kock, & 
Amin, 2012). Though this is likely to be the case in certain circumstances – as is the 
implication of Ugandan, Congolese and Sudanese armies (Apobo, 2004; Gettleman, 2012; 
Gossmann, 2010) – it does not add up to the current scale of ivory trade. The picture is likely 
to be much messier; as one interviewee put it, “everyone’s at it”.  
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